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Abstract 
These three articles critically examined the priorities of American higher 
education institutions through studying their patterns of spending. Precipitated from an 
interest in the consequences that the Great Recession in 2008 and 2009 had on public 
higher education institutions in the United States, this research studied how the 
institutions chose to allocate their financial resources. By using finances as a measure of 
priorities across the higher education system, these collective choices revealed systemic 
priorities. Each of these three articles analyzed these priorities from a unique perspective.  
Article one examined the consequences of changes in state funding on the 
likelihood of academic programs closing by discipline. Using survival analysis with data 
between 2000 and 2009 from 574 institutions, the study addressed the question of 
whether changes in state funding had an effect on academic program closures and 
whether effects differed across academic disciplines. This study contributed!to the higher 
education literature by identifying environmental variables that stakeholders could 
monitor. It also provided a more complex and contrasting perspective to the most recent 
literature published on academic program closures. Finally, the stages of budget 
contraction in the literature were affirmed by this study.  
The second article showed how institutions’ tuition revenues and state funding 
allocations affect the subsequent expenditure patterns. Using growth curve modeling to 
analyze data between 1990 and 2009 of 165 public research institutions this study 
provided insights to how changes in revenues disproportionally effect changes in 
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expenditures. Results demonstrated that negative changes in state funding had 
significantly different effects on functional areas' proportion of expenditures than did 
positive changes in state funding. Further, positive and negative changes in tuition 
revenues had effects on different functional areas. 
The third article inspected inter-collegiate athletics within the American higher 
education system and looked at progress toward fulfillment of Title IX by longitudinally 
analyzing expenditures per sport by gender. Published research had studied participation 
numbers over time, but no known research studied expenditures as a way to measure 
progress toward gender equity. This study used univariate growth curve modeling to 
examine self-reported data from 990 institutions between 2003 and 2010. The findings 
demonstrated that the growth in funding for men’s teams is greater and getting faster than 
the growth in funding for women’s teams.  
 !
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 This research precipitated from an interest in the consequences that the Great 
Recession in 2008 and 2009 had on public higher education institutions in the United 
States. Measuring the way that administrators choose to allocate resources highlights the 
priorities of the institution. Further, these priorities are challenged when institutions 
absorb state funding cuts. Using finances as a measure of priorities, the following three 
articles critically examine the allocations of financial resources from three different 
perspectives.  
Recent events 
The Great Recession has affected public higher education in the United States 
through funding cuts to state institutions (Bozeman, 2010; Desrochers and Wellman, 
2011). These funding cuts have been absorbed or compensated through a variety of ways 
including tuition hikes, furloughs, and program closures (Bunsis and Bradley, 2011; 
Chapman, Glen, Howard, June, and Kaya, 2010; Zumeta, 2009). 
Closure of academic programs have been reported in several recent news accounts 
over the past two years. The president of State University of New York at Albany ended 
new admissions to five academic programs, initiating their elimination, following a 
reported 30% decline in state funding since 2008 (Chapman et al., 2010). In October 
2010 the University of Missouri announced 75 programs were under consideration for 
elimination or merging following a $500-millon state budget deficit and a governor-
ordered review of academic programs (Chapman et al., 2010). After annual reductions in 
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state-funding allocations since 2009 the Louisiana Board of Regents is examining 459 
academic programs for closure by 2012 fiscal year (Blum, 2011).  
The outlook going forward may be grim. The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided states with over $151 billion in funding that was used 
to fill state budget gaps as a result of The Great Recession. With these funds now 
depleted and state tax revenues still down, most states are projected to have further 
budget cuts on the horizon. Forecasts by the National Conference of State Legislatures 
currently project over $40.5 billion in state budget gaps for fiscal year 2012 and over 
$40.9 billion for fiscal year 2013 (The Fiscal Survey of States: Fall 2010, 2010).  
Why study higher education finances 
The way in which higher education institutions allocate their financial resources is 
a statement of the institution’s priorities. Individuals that comprise each institution have 
differing priorities and they compete for these limited resources. This collective decision 
making each year results in final fiscal expenditures that can be viewed as representing 
the collective priorities and therefore the institution’s priorities.   
There are multiple ways in which one could measure institutional priorities 
including the allocation of employee time, interviews with the chief administrator, 
surveys representative stakeholders, or analysis of governing board minutes, to name a 
few examples. However each of these come with considerable time, expense, and their 
own limitations.  
Since 1965 the U.S. Department of Education has collected data on institutional 
finances in increasing detail. Recent work done by the Delta Cost Project has made these 
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data more useful for longitudinal analysis. Today there is high-quality data available from 
every public four-year institution going back over 20 years.  
Overview of articles 
The following three articles took three perspectives on examining the priorities of 
institutions within the American higher education system. Special attention was given to 
the public institutions in article one and article two due to their state funding revenues. 
This focus arose out of a desire to better understand how institutions may respond to the 
aforementioned recent events.  
Article one, “Academics under the Ax” examined the consequences of changes in 
state funding on the likelihood of academic programs closing by discipline. The study 
addressed the question of whether state funding has an effect of academic program 
closures and whether these effects differ across academic disciplines. Understanding this 
relationship highlighted the consequences of changes in state funding.  
Article two, “Changes in Revenues for Higher Education and their Differential 
Consequences for Institutional Expenditure Areas” showed how institutions’ tuition 
revenues and state funding allocations affect subsequent expenditure patterns. These 
funds need not necessary be distributed evenly and understanding the patterns of 
expenditures across American public higher education system can contribute insight into 
the system’s collective priorities.  
Article three, “Who’s on the Inside Track: Examining Gender Equity in the 
Funding Trends of Intercollegiate Athletics” inspected the functional area of athletics 
within the American higher education system. It looked at progress toward fulfillment of 
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Title IX by longitudinally analyzing expenditures by gender. Published research has 
studied participation numbers over time, but no known research studied expenditures as a 
way to measure progress toward gender equity, and more broadly institutions’ priorities.  
  
! 5!
References 
Blum, J. (2011, January 27). Board of Regents lists college cuts. The Advocate. Baton 
Rouge, LA. Retrieved April 20, 2011, from 
http://www.2theadvocate.com/news/latest/114695014.html 
Bozeman, B. (2010). Hard Lessons from Hard Times: Reconsidering and Reorienting the 
“Managing Decline” Literature. Public Administration Review. 
Bunsis, H., & Bradley, G. (2011, March 31). Myths on Program Elimination. Inside 
Higher Ed. Retrieved March 31, 2011, from 
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2011/03/31/essay_on_elimination_of_program
s_at_colleges 
Chapman, P., Glenn, D., Howard, J., June, A. W., & Kaya, T. (2010, October 24). 
Program Cuts Loom at 4 Public Universities. The Chronicle of Higher Education. 
Retrieved October 25, 2010, from http://chronicle.com/article/Program-Cuts-Loom-
at-4-Public/125080/ 
Desrochers, D. M., & Wellman, J. V. (2011). Trends in College Spending 1999-2009 (pp. 
1–64). Delta Project on Postsecondary Education Costs, Productivity, and 
Accountability. 
The Fiscal Survey of States: Fall 2010. (2010). The Fiscal Survey of States: Fall 2010. 
National Governors Association and the National Association of State Budget 
Officers. Retrieved April 23, 2011, from 
http://www.nasbo.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=EQnlICsAJD8%3d&tabid=38 
! 6!
Zumeta, W. (2009, February 17). State Support of Higher Education: The Roller Coaster 
Plunges Downward Yet Again. The NEA 2009 Almanac of Higher Education. 
Retrieved January 28, 2010, from 
http://www.nea.org/assets/img/PubAlmanac/ALM_09_03.pdf 
! 7!
 
Chapter 2.   
Academics under the Ax: Examining Academic Program Closures After State 
Funding Cuts Using Survival Analysis   
 Clinton M. Stephens 
Introduction 
Approximately three-quarters of all post-secondary students in the United States 
are enrolled in public institutions. Across the United States nearly every public state 
institution has suffered cuts in funding from their state since The Great Recession began 
in 2008. Further, funding from The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
was winding down in 2010  (The Fiscal Survey of States, 2010). Higher education 
institutions (HEI) used ARRA funding to back-fill budget shortfalls, and when that 
funding runs out—without substantial increases in state funding—many institutions will 
once again face budget cuts. When nearly every state cuts higher education funding, it 
effects the institutions attended by the vast majority of college students in the United 
States.  
The literature on university budget contractions provides minimal insight into the 
current financial times (Dickeson, 2010). Little work has been done to measure the 
consequences of funding cuts on HEI. No known literature addresses the effects of 
funding cuts on the intra-institutional level across multiple institutions. A better 
understanding of the ways that public institutions are internally absorbing cuts in state 
funding is needed.    
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Statement of the problem. 
During fiscal contractions academic programs are initially spared (Morgan, 1982). 
But the more severe or prolonged the fiscal contraction, the greater the risk of closure to 
academic programs (Morgan). The closure of one academic program reduces the 
educational opportunities for those students at that one institution, however when 
closures happen throughout the American higher education system the loss of educational 
opportunities becomes systemic. Systemic program closures represent decreased student 
opportunities for study and decreased faculty employment opportunities. Following 
systemic program closures, fewer appointments for faculty in those fields leads to 
reduced research and public service in those fields.              
In times of declining resources, understanding the relationship between state 
appropriations to public institutions and the likelihood of academic program closures is 
needed to inform our understanding of how financial cuts may effect program offerings. 
This increased understanding would better inform the decisions of policymakers, HEI 
administrators, faculty, and students. Further, the results of simultaneous cuts in funding 
to HEI across the United States may have different systemic effects on different academic 
disciplines. Better understanding differences in academic program closure rates between 
fields is needed to inform how funding cuts may systemically shift available academic 
programs.  
Purpose. 
This study will contribute to the literature on higher education finance by 
examining the effects of state funding cuts on academic programs at public HEI. These 
effects will be measured by examining the likelihood of academic program closures. 
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Specifically, survival analysis models will be used to measure the risk of an academic 
program closure as predicted by changes in the previous year’s state funding levels, while 
holding constant a vector of control variables. 
Within the scope of this study, encompassing public four-year higher education 
institutions, three research questions will be addressed. First, do state funding changes 
have a measurable effect on the closure rates of academic programs? Second, do changes 
in state funding effect academic program closures at different rates across academic 
disciplines? Third, do state funding reductions have differing effects on academic 
program closures across major Carnegie Classifications? For the purposes of this study 
academic disciplines will be defined as humanities; social science; business; education; 
health sciences; and science technology, engineering and math (STEM) fields (The 
Education Trust, 2009). A final category, Other, will encompass a variety of specialized 
academic programs including agriculture, culinary arts, human sciences, library sciences, 
military technologies, leisure studies, and security services (The Education Trust, 2009). 
For this study major Carnegie Classifications will be defined using the latest Carnegie 
Classifications for Research, Master's and Bachelor's institutions.  
Theoretical framework. 
This study draws upon theories from the model of higher education contractions 
(Morgan, 1982), the economics of public sector institutions (Paulsen, 2001), and the 
higher education production function (Hopkins, 1990) for its theoretical framework.  
Discussed more fully in the literature review, Morgan's theory asserted that academic 
programs are subject to closure in the advanced stages of institutional contraction.  This 
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study is rooted in the assertion that colleges and universities undergo contractions due to 
external political causes from state governments withdrawing their financial support.   
The closely related work of Paulsen offered that the overall supply of higher 
education is influenced by the fiscal support which it received from state legislatures 
(2001). This fiscal support affects where an institution fits on the production function, 
and any changes in fiscal support will cause the institution to modify its outputs—
including possibly academic programs—to move to a new equilibrium in the production 
function (Hopkins, 1990). This study draws conceptually on Paulsen's and Hopkins' work 
that reduced state fiscal support reduces the supply of higher education and the 
institutions will seek a new equilibrium by modifying its outputs which, in the context of 
this study, is choosing to close academic programs.  
Review of the Literature 
The related literature for this study includes research on changes in academic 
programs offered over time, fiscal contractions, and the supply of higher education. First 
the issue of changes in academic program over time provides context for this study. The 
reaction of HEI administrators during cuts in external funding is useful to frame how and 
when to expect the risk of program closures. Also relevant to this study is the economic 
relationship of public and private demand for higher education and how it effects its 
supply, while maximizing the utility of the inputs for production of outputs.      
Growth in academic programs. 
Writing on the need for academic priorities, Dickeson (2010) discussed the 
"dearth of helpful literature in the field" (p. xvii) of resource reallocations in times of 
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reduced revenues. He underscored that the lack of literature is a hazard for institutions 
that must undertake reallocating program resources without guidance.  
Dickeson (2010) observed that the number of academics programs has doubled in 
recent years. Assessing the scope of modern institutions, Dickeson concurred  with 
Hefferlin's assertion "the modern American multiversities have grown by absorbing one 
by one the multitude of services formerly performed by specialized institutions" (1969, p. 
31).  But Dickeson particularly noted that between 1970 and 2006 the distribution of total 
degrees conferred by subject area had shifted (Table 1). Gains over this time period were 
made in the fields of business, computer science and engineering, and humanities. Degree 
conferment shifted away from the fields of social and behavioral sciences, natural 
sciences, and education.  
-- Table 1 about here -- 
Despite this trend in awarding of degrees, Dickeson observed that "the historic 
tendency has been to add and not to delete, to plant and not to prune" (2010, p. 56).  
Institutions are more inclined to add new programs without cutting existing programs. 
These tendencies are manifested in the vague language of mission statements, most 
which "cover all the eventualities" (p. 37) and can serve to support new programs but fail 
to ever define an existing program outside the institution's mission. Such inclination has 
the long-term consequence of institutions accumulating new programs that are rarely at 
risk of future elimination.     
Budget contractions. 
Prior research on funding cuts in educational settings examined the trade-off 
decisions made. Berne and Stiefel examined trade-offs between capital and maintenance 
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versus operating expenditures, and teacher salaries versus teacher positions. They found 
that operating and salary expenditures were prioritized over capital and maintenance 
expenditures and teacher positions (Berne & Stiefel, 1993).  
Studying organizational decline, largely the source of budget contractions, Levine 
built on prior work (Katz & Kahn, 1966; Wamsley & Zald, 1973), to outline a two-
dimension model of decline causes. The first dimension was internal versus external. This 
described whether the cause was within the organization or external of the organization 
and due to declining demand or interest. The second dimension was political versus 
economic/technical and sourced these causes as rooted in the political capacity to 
influence the circumstances or in more technical causes such as increases costs and 
growing inefficiencies (Levine, 1978). Together these two dimensions create a four-
quadrant grid explaining four distinct causes of organizational decline. 
-- Table 2 about here --  
Later this model was extended and applied to higher education (Morgan, 1982), as 
illustrated in Table 2. He advanced that decline in higher education institutions can result 
from any quadrant, or a combination of quadrants (p. 554).  The sources of institutional 
decline identified from internal sources included political capacity to resist funding cuts 
and economic/technical reasons such as increasing costs and organization rigidity. For 
external causes, political sources identified include decline in public support for the 
institution and economic/technical sources included declining enrollments or shifting 
market demand. 
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Also Morgan proposed a scale of budget-contraction environments that HEI might 
face. The typology scale had four stages: slowed growth, temporary contraction, short-
term substantial contraction, and long-term substantial contraction (Morgan, 1982).  
In Morgan's typology for slowed growth of institutions the common causes would 
be external fiscal constraints or internal enrollment growth declines. Typical institutional 
responses may include increased efficiencies, self study, and increased marketing efforts.  
Morgan cited these conditions as common in the U.S. and the U.K. during the 1970's.   
In times of temporary contractions of institutions, Morgan's typology includes 
common causes as external budget cuts or declining enrollment. Typical institutional 
responses include deferment of major expenditures and program reviews for selective 
cutting. During recessions in the U.S., HEI in many states often experience temporary 
contractions.   
For short-term but substantial contractions of institutions, Morgan's typology 
includes common causes as a severe recession or major internal re-organization. Typical 
institutional responses may include major changes in personnel policies, intensive 
program reviews, and reductions or closures in selected programs. Substantial 
contractions were experienced at many HEI during the 1930's in the Great Depression 
(Morgan, 1982). 
Finally for long-term, substantial contractions of institutions, Morgan's typology 
include common causes as on-going uncertainty around institutional viability and 
sustained loses in organizational, political, and economic standing. Typical institutional 
responses would include program closures and liquidation of assets. A few private 
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colleges have experienced long-term substantial contractions in the United States 
(Morgan, 1982).  
Morgan's scale provides a framework for understanding the severity of budget 
cuts. Academic programs are mentioned frequently through the scale, progressing from 
reviewing programs for selective reductions during temporary contractions to full 
program closures during long-term contractions. Academic programs are protected early 
in the scale, but as budget cuts become more severe academic programs are placed on the 
table and their reduction and closure become a necessity in later stages of Morgan's scale.    
Supply of higher education. 
Paulsen (2001) explained that demand for public education is driven by both 
public and private sources, illustrated in the supply and demand curves of Figure 1. 
Society has an interest in the "external or public benefits generated from higher 
education" (p. 108).  Such societal benefit drives the public to desire more of its members 
to obtain higher education. In turn, this increases the societal demand for higher 
education.  The private sources of demand come from individuals who desire to invest in 
their higher education. But these individuals do not take into account the external societal 
benefits of obtaining higher education, and therefore are only willing to pay the tuition 
rate for which they perceive they will privately benefit more than the cost of tuition. 
Heller who stipulated that four-year public higher education institutions accommodate all 
students meeting admissions requirements who wish to enroll (Heller, 1999) and that the 
marginal cost for each gain or loss of one student is the same to the institution. Therefore 
institutions' are willing to supply sufficient higher education to meet the private demand 
of students willing to pay the tuition necessary to cover the institutions' marginal costs. 
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This creates a gap between overall demand for higher education–combined public and 
private demand–and the supply from higher education institutions. The societal demand 
can be addressed through public policy through providing public subsidies. Paulsen 
asserted that when state legislatures allocate funds to the public institutions, the 
institutions' marginal costs are reduced. When this decrease in marginal costs is reflected 
through decreases in tuition rates, more students are willing to pay the new rate for which 
they perceive they will privately derive more benefit than the new cost of tuition.   
-- Figure 1 about here -- 
Conversely, decreases in allocation of state funds to public institutions results in 
increases in institutions' marginal costs. This increased marginal cost reflected in new 
tuition rates causes fewer students to perceive greater private benefits than the new 
tuition cost. Therefore a marginal decline occurs in students obtaining higher education. 
Paulsen asserted that when fewer students seek higher education, the supply from public 
institutions also is reduced to match the new demand.  
Hopkins (1990) synthesized the research on the higher education production 
function. This function is a theoretical construct to represent the means through which a 
HEI converts inputs into outputs, represented in Figure 2. Ideally, the multiple inputs 
would be maximized to produce the maximum outputs. Hopkins acknowledged that the 
production function remains difficult to fully identify due to intangible inputs and outputs 
that comprise key parts, such as quality of matriculating students and quality of services 
rendered. Hopkins further pointed out that "there is no reason to believe that the 
educational enterprise has been operating on the efficient frontier of production 
possibilities; and there are many reasons to believe that is has not" (p. 13). Without any 
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institution operating at maximum efficiency the production possibility curve cannot be 
empirically measured. However the production function remains useful as a tool to 
convey the relationship of inputs and outputs in mathematical terms. The production 
function is conceptually applied in this study through its assertion that reduced inputs to a 
higher education institution will also reduce the institution's outputs.  
-- Figure 2 about here -- 
Methodology 
Design. 
 To examine the likelihood of an academic program’s closure, I chose to use 
survival analysis modeling, a subset of the methods comprising the event history analysis 
field. The technique has been successfully employed in many recent longitudinal studies 
in higher education (DesJardins & McCall, 2010; Doyle, 2006). Survival analysis allows 
measuring the likelihood that the event of interest will occur at each time period in the 
study while accounting for time-dependent events, such as a funding cut, that affect the 
event of interest. For this study, the event of interest is the closure of an academic 
program.  
Survival analysis language uses many terms that are non-intuitive in the context 
of the study—survival, hazard rate, censoring, truncating—and an explanation of how 
these terms are applied is in order. The measurement of an academic program’s 
likelihood to continue each year was viewed as survival. Conversely, the hazard rate was 
the likelihood of an academic program closing (Allison, 1984). Each academic year that 
an academic program existed was considered a period in which it was at risk of 
experiencing the event of interest (Singer & Willett, 2003; Yamaguchi, 1991). In the 
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initial year of the study's sample period almost all the academic programs were already 
established and their years of existence prior to the sample period are unmeasured, which 
is called left censoring (Singer & Willett, 2003; Yamaguchi, 1991). In the final year of 
the sample many academic programs continued and it is unknown if or when they closed 
after the study period, called right censoring (Singer & Willett, 2003; Yamaguchi, 1991).  
The hazard rate for this study was the likelihood of an academic program closing 
in each year of the sample period. This hazard rate “controls both the occurrence and 
timing of events” (Allison, 1984, p. 16). Even when a program closure does not occur in 
a given year, when the academic program was present for that year it was at risk of 
closure. Therefore a program's existence informs the likelihood of an event, or hazard 
rate. This derived measurement serves as the dependent variable. Estimating the hazard 
rate for each period of time, t, was done using the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard 
formula in Figure 3. Survival rate, which is the converse of the hazard rate, was 
calculated using the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor function in Figure 4. 
-- Figure 3 and Figure 4 about here -- 
Modeling program closure. 
The fully formed equation to address the first research question–state funding 
effects on closure rates of academic programs–is identified in Figure 5. The second 
research question was addressed  using the same model with subsets for each discipline 
from the full dataset, defined in the next section. Analysis was done with each 
observation in the dataset representing every academic program, defined by the 
Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) taxonomy, in each year of the study. The 
formula notation uses cip to denote academic programs, hei to denote higher education 
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institutions, and t to denote the year during the time period studied. The predicted 
dependent variable is the hazard rate of program closure for each academic program in 
each year. For each academic program in each year, the alpha denotes the intercept and 
the mu denotes the error term.  
-- Figure 5 about here -- 
The rate of change in state appropriations was calculated for each year by 
subtracting the state appropriation level the prior year from the current year's state 
appropriation level and then dividing the difference by the prior level. The resulting 
quotient is the rate of change in state funding annually. The remaining variables in the 
model serve as control variables and are discussed in the section on the data and control 
variables.  
In addition to the variables of interest in this research several additional factors 
may influence the likelihood of academic program closures. To separate these effects 
from the effects of the variables of interest the following control variables were included 
in the model. Based on the literature review, other revenue sources beyond state 
appropriations were  considered likely to influence program closures; variables capturing 
rates of change in alternate revenue sources were included. The number of students 
completing an academic program was hypothesized to be inversely related to the 
program's hazard rate of being closed, therefore the total number of graduates each year 
for the academic program was included, and logarithmically transformed to account for 
disproportionate effect of program size. Further, the program's graduates as a ratio of the 
institution's total graduates was hypothesized to serve as an impact factor of that 
program's position in the institution and therefore that ratio was also included as an 
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independent variable. Several indicator variables were included to capture differing 
institutional missions, including the status of HEI as land grants or operating a medical 
school.     
Effects coding was used to analyze the categorical variable of discipline. This is a 
relatively new technique in educational research (Mayhew, 2011). Traditionally when 
analyzing endogenous categorical variables researchers have used indicator-variable 
coding. This method requires one category be selected as the reference group by which 
the remaining categories' coefficients are interpreted. However in this study's use of 
academic disciplines there is no theoretical basis by which to select one discipline as the 
reference group. Further, interpreting discipline's coefficients as relative to an arbitrary 
reference discipline would not have a theoretical basis and have little practical meaning. 
The disciplines all are present in the higher education system relative to each other.  
Effects coding eliminates the need for a reference group and allows comparison to the 
overall average (Mayhew, 2011).    
Data. 
 The data of interest for this study was collected by the Department of Education's 
National Center for Educational Statistics as part of the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS). All institutions participating in any federal financial 
assistance programs authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education Act are required to 
complete all IPEDS surveys. Failure to comply subjects an institution to fines or 
jeopardized eligibility for participation in federal financial assistance programs (Statutory 
Requirements for Reporting IPEDS Data, 2011). This generates a near-universal response 
rate to the surveys and provides a census of HEI in the United States every year.  
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A subset of the longitudinal dataset was made for this study to include only four-
year public higher education institutions that existed for the 10 years spanning 2000-
2009. Public institutions are the focus of this study, and specifically four-year 
institutions. The issues examined in this study may be relevant to two-year institutions, 
but they are outside the scope of this research.  For this study, after removing incomplete 
records, there were a total of 574 institutions represented in the dataset.  
Years. 
Data for this study were obtained for every year from 2000 through 2009, 
providing 10 years for analysis. All IPEDS data is structured and provided as an 
individual year it was collected. To analyze any IPEDS data longitudinally, the provided 
individual-year datasets must be merged together into a common dataset. This is aided by 
the use of a unique record identifier, “unitid,” that is largely consistent across individual-
year datasets.  
However, in a large dataset such as IPEDS, even infrequent errors accumulate to 
effect many institutions' longitudinal records over the time period of interest. In merging 
multiple year datasets together sequentially, an error in one institutional record’s unique 
identifier in a single year causes that record’s prior and subsequent years to not match. 
This results in the record’s longitudinal data remaining disconnected at the year of the 
error. Such a record is indistinguishable from one institution’s closing and another 
institution’s opening. This error, multiplied over many institutions and then again over 
every year in the longitudinal dataset quickly reduces the dataset’s accuracy and usability 
for meaningful longitudinal analysis. 
! 21!
To counter this problem found with longitudinal analysis of IPEDS data, several 
steps were taken to verify and to correct for mismatches. The matching of institutions 
was done in five waves, with verification steps after each wave to ensure correct matches. 
Each wave matched on multiple variables in the two datasets, including the unique 
identifier, ZIP code, state, and institution name. In the first wave the most rigorous 
matching criteria were met, the remaining unmatched institutions then entered the next 
wave with slightly less-strict matching on a smaller institution set. After each wave the 
matches were verified by comparing other variables and ensuring expected values for 
institution name, changes in student body size, and changes in faculty member counts.  
These matchings were done for each pair of sequential years first. There were rare 
cases of institutions not existing in the dataset for one or more years, then re-appearing. 
To address this missing data issue, matching was done across multiple years when an 
adjacent year dataset did not contain an institution. This allowed such an institution to 
still be correctly identified across the longitudinal dataset. 
Collectively, these steps greatly reduced the data integrity problems in the IPEDS 
dataset created by mis-matching errors, failed matches, and missing data. Reducing these 
issues provided a more reliable longitudinal dataset for analysis. 
Variables. 
The IPEDS finance survey is collected annually between December and April for 
data pertaining to the prior fiscal year's revenues and expenses (IPEDS Survey 
Components And Data Collection And Dissemination Cycle, 2011). During the period of 
study there were changes in the reporting forms used to collect finance data, moving" to 
the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) starting in 2002. For two years 
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using the old or the new form was optional, then the new form was required starting in 
2004 (IPEDS Finance Data FASB and GASB, 2011). Reporting of the data of interest, 
state funding levels, for this study did not change substantively across the old and new 
reporting forms. During data cleaning care was taken to account for the optional years. 
The data of interest was collapsed from the old and new formats into common variables 
for analysis. State funding levels for each year in the period of study were then 
transformed into a rate of change from funding the prior year. This resulted in each 
record of the longitudinal dataset having a rate of change.  
The IPEDS completions survey is collected annually during September and 
October for data on the prior academic year (IPEDS Survey Components And Data 
Collection And Dissemination Cycle, 2011). Data is gathered on the counts of students 
completing a degree in each academic program at the institution. These completion 
counts are reported within standardized taxonomy of categories called Classification of 
Instructional Programs (CIP) codes. Originally developed in 1980, the CIP taxonomy has 
been revised in 1985, 1990, 2000, and 2010. The revisions add, move, and delete 
categories--making analysis across revisions more challenging and prone to error. In 
addition to academic programs, the CIP taxonomy captures completion data across levels 
of degree, providing the opportunity for analysis in this study of differences between 
bachelor's and graduate academic programs (CIP - Introduction to the Classification of 
Instructional Programs, 2011). In the dataset an academic program is considered active 
when data is reported for that program. When institutions stop reporting for a CIP code 
this change is used in this study to mark a program closure–the event of interest for the 
survival analysis models used in this study. During data analysis, it was found that an 
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institution may skip reporting an academic program for one or more years. The vast 
majority of these were one year in length and the program resumed reporting data the 
following year. Therefore, the analysis accounted for these by counting academic 
programs active during these one-year skips.    
The finance variables used as control variables for this study were compiled from 
IPEDS datasets. The sources of revenue outside state appropriations were compiled using 
the same IPEDS finance survey as the source of state appropriations data. These sources 
used as control variables included tuition, federal appropriations and grants, local 
appropriations and grants, state grants, private gifts, auxiliary revenue, and independent 
operations revenue. Each of these variables was constructed using definitions defined in 
the Delta Cost Project (Wellman, Desrochers, and Lenihan, 2009). 
Additional control variables for this study were also collected from IPEDS, 
including HEI status as land grants, operating medical schools, bachelor's degree 
program, total graduates of the academic program, and each institution's total graduates.  
Analysis. 
These data were analyzed using the program R, version 2.14.2, running the 
‘survival’ package, version 2.36-12, and the ‘KMsurv’ package, version 0.1-4. Estimates 
were done using Cox proportional-hazards regression using a Weibull distribution, as 
discussed in the study’s design. The resulting coefficients were each multiplied by -1 to 
make their interpretation more intuitive. The dataset was analyzed and extended with 
additional measurements. An indicator variable was added to mark the last year of an 
academic program's existence if it ceased being reported during the time frame of this 
study. Exceptions were made for data anomalies, including if the entire institution did not 
! 24!
report for a year, the institution reported programs using a deleted or merged CIP code, or 
if an academic program was not reported for one year but was reported the subsequent 
year.    
Results 
To address the research questions—how changes in state funding affect the 
closure rates of academic programs—a Cox proportional hazard regression was 
calculated. The unit of analysis for every model was the academic program per year. 
Several models were calculated to examine different ways of answering the research 
questions. First a base model was calculated to understand how closure probabilities are 
predicted by the control variables, with the results in Table 3 and Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
Then the base model was calculated with a subset of only academic programs in a given 
discipline, results reported in Table 4 and Figures 10 and 11. To compare each discipline 
to all the others models with an indicator variable were calculated for each discipline and 
reported in Table 5 and Figure 12 and 13. Finally a full model of the control variables and 
indicator variables for each discipline, using effects coding to compare with the sample's 
average, was calculated and results reported in Table 6 and Figures 14 and 15.  
Interpretations of these results will be discussed in the following section. 
 Model by Carnegie Classification. 
To address the first and third research question, the first survival analysis model 
was constructed with the independent variables previously discussed in the methodology 
section. The results of the first model are shown in Table 3.  
-- Table 3 about here -- 
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For all 574 four-year public institutions, 14,740 program closures were observed 
over the nine-year period of this study, with 411,738 observations at risk of closure, for a 
rate of 3.58%. Changes in state appropriations had minute, but measurable effects on  
academic programs' probabilities of continuing into the next year as increasing the 
probability by 0.00006 (p < 0.001). Academic programs for bachelor degrees were 0.144 
more probable (p < 0.001) to continue into the following year than graduate degrees. For 
each additional student that programs graduated, the probability of the program 
continuing the following year was 0.606 (p < 0.001) for every 10-fold gain in graduating 
students. The variables measuring impact factor of the program's graduates as a 
percentage of HEI's graduates, land grant status, and medical institution were not 
statistically significant. The vector of eight financial control variables had five variables 
that were highly statistically significant for predicting a closure, but with small 
magnitudes.    
-- Figure 6 and 7 about here -- 
For each of the Carnegie classifications of 166 Research, 268 Master's, and 142 
Bachelor's institutions the model predicted differing contributors to program closures. 
Program closures of 9,397; 4,368; and 983 respectively were observed over the 10-year 
period of this study, with 240,798; 147,637; and 23,675 respective observations at risk of 
closure. These had respective closure rates of 3.9%, 3.0%, and 4.2%. The closure rates of 
academic programs at Research institutions were predicted 0.002 lower for every increase 
in percent change in state appropriations (p < 0.001). The closure rates of academic 
programs at Master's institutions were 0.00007 lower for every increase in percent change 
in state appropriations (p < 0.001). Academic program closures at Bachelor's institutions 
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were 0.006 more likely to close due to one percent increases in state appropriations. 
Academic programs for bachelor degrees were more likely to continue into the following 
year, at probabilities of 0.114, 0.190, and 0.734 respectively (all p < 0.001). For each 10-
fold increase in students that programs graduated, the probability of the program 
continuing the following year was increased by 0.607, 0.662, and 0.513 respectively (all 
p < 0.001). The variables measuring impact factor of the program's graduates as a 
percentage of HEI's graduates, land grant status, and medical institution were not 
statistically significant with two exceptions. Academic programs at Bachelor's 
institutions with land grant status were 0.301 less likely to close and academic programs 
at Master's institutions with medical programs were 0.208 less likely to close (both p < 
0.001).    
-- Figure 8 and 9 about here -- 
Model by each discipline. 
To address research question three, the predictive model was ran for each 
academic discipline only. This provided insight into how the independent variables 
predicted academic program closures differently across disciplines.  The results of these 
seven survival analysis regressions are shown in Table 4.    
-- Table 4 about here -- 
Percent changes in state appropriation had an effect across every discipline (p < 
0.001), except academic programs in STEM were unaffected. Percent changes in state 
appropriations predicted substantively higher likelihood of academic programs 
continuing each year in Humanities, Social Sciences, Business, Education, and Health 
Sciences with decreases in closure likelihood of 0.228; 0.061; 0.016; 0.226; and 0.644 
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respectively (p < 0.001). Health Sciences were helped most by changes in state 
appropriations, with every percent change proportionally making academic programs in 
Health Sciences 0.644 more likely to continue when holding all other variables constant.      
-- Figure 10 and 11 about here -- 
Academic programs that served bachelor's degrees were highly statistically 
significantly (p < 0.001) less likely to close than graduate programs in every discipline 
except Education and Other disciplines. This was strongest in Social Sciences, 0.304, and 
STEM, 0.351. The number of students graduating from the academic program were also 
statistically significant (p < 0.001)  predictor of academic programs continuing, with each 
discipline predicted with relatively high increases in probability of continuing.  The 
percentage of the institution's total graduating students was not significant for any 
discipline. Academic programs at land grant institutions were less likely to close in 
Health Sciences, with a value of 0.052 (p < 0.001). Programs at institutions that award 
medical degrees were no more likely to close in any discipline. 
Modeling each discipline separately is informative, but lacks the power of 
comparison across disciplines. The next section discusses the model as ran comparing 
each discipline to the sample average.  
Model with single discipline indicator variable. 
To enable comparisons across the disciplines, the model was calculated for each 
discipline with the full dataset and using an indicator variable for a different discipline 
each run. For each discipline, this allowed all other disciplines to serve as the reference 
group. Results of this model are shown in Table 5. 
-- Table 5 about here -- 
! 28!
Results of the state appropriations variables become much smaller in magnitude 
after the indicator variable of discipline was introduced. Adding the discipline-specific 
indicator variable provided a measure of each discipline's likelihood of closing in 
comparison to all other disciplines. The coefficients for the indicator variable were 
moderate to non-significant. The highest affect were among the academic programs, in 
order, of Social Sciences, Humanities, and STEM which saw an increase of 0.570, 0.459, 
and 0.328 in likelihood (p < 0.001) of continuing to the next year. Academic programs in 
the disciplines of Business, Education, Health Sciences, and other programs saw no 
statistically significant changes in likelihood of closing from being a part of these 
disciplines.  
-- Figure 12 and 13 about here -- 
After controlling for each academic program's discipline, the changes in state 
appropriations had consistent affects across all disciplines. Percent changes in state 
appropriations predicted minute changes in the likelihood of an academic program 
closing in any discipline.  
Model with indicator variables for every discipline. 
To better understand how all the disciplines collectively affect the likelihood of 
program closures, a model was calculated with an indicator variable for each discipline. 
Using indicator variables in this manner normally requires a reference group, however 
effects coding was used in this analysis to avoid a reference group. With effects coding, 
coefficients for each discipline's indicator variable are interpreted as compared to the 
overall sample's average.  The results for this model are displayed in Table 6.  For all 574 
HEI in the dataset, the model results for the percent changes state appropriations, 
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financial control variables, and other control variables were all meaningfully unchanged 
from the prior models.  
-- Table 6 about here -- 
Academic programs were least likely to close when they were a part of the Social 
Sciences, STEM, or Humanities disciplines with probabilities of continuing to the next 
year of 0.474, 0.271, and 0.390 respectively (p < 0.001). The academic programs in 
Business, Education, Health Sciences, and Other academic programs had no statistically 
significant difference in their probability of closure than the sample's average.    
This model was then run again on subsets of the dataset for each major Carnegie 
classification, shown in the subsequent columns of Table 6. Here the probability of 
academic program closure varied widely across Research, Master's, and Bachelor's 
institutions. The lowest probabilities of closures were in Social Sciences and Master's and 
Bachelor's institutions, with 0.589 and 0.540 probabilities of continuing to the next year 
(p < 0.001).  Beyond this, the probabilities by discipline in the model of all institutions 
were meaningfully similar at Research, Master's, and Bachelor's institutions.  
-- Figure 14 and 15 about here -- 
Confounding issues. 
Throughout all of the models calculated there were multiple coefficients 
predicting reduced probability of an academic program closing that were highly 
statistically significant (p < 0.001). But no negative coefficients were statistically 
significant, predicting an increased probability of an academic program closing. This is 
unlikely to mean that the independent variables in the models contribute only to academic 
programs continuing. But, rather, the confluence two confounding issues. 
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First, the likelihood of an academic program closing is small. Over the 10 years in 
this study of 411,738 annual academic program observations, only 3.5% were coded as 
the academic program's final year before closing. This is a small rate from which the 
survival analysis models then calculated the a probability of closure. From the start, this 
study is attempting to predict the probability of an exceedingly unlikely event. This also 
means that the coefficients calculated for a variable's contribution to an academic 
program's probability to close is relative to the already very low probability of closure in 
the entire sample.      
Second, there are many unobserved variables that contribute to the decision to 
close an academic program, as discussed in the further research section. In the models 
estimated these are captured in the random effects term. The departure of an academic 
program's faculty may lead to its closure or a shift in institutional focus may contribute to 
an academic program's probability of closure. These political events are unmeasured in 
the models calculated but certainly plan a role in the HEI administrators' decision-making 
processes.  
These two factors, closure as a rare event and unobserved variables, are present in 
all the models of this study.  Despite these random effects, many coefficients were found 
to be highly statistically significant. The variables with positive coefficients have 
significant implications as they are highly likely to contribute to the continuation of 
academic programs.     
-- Table 7, Figure 16 and 17 about here -- 
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Consideration of bachelor’s institutions. 
Throughout the analyses of this study when results were calculated by Carnegie 
Classification the 95% confidence intervals on the hazard rate for academic programs at 
Bachelor's institutions were much wider than any other Research institutions or Master's 
institutions. This is most easily visualized in Figure 8, spanning 100% to 51%, and Figure 
14, spanning 100% to 53%.  Such large confidence intervals are the result of fewer 
Bachelor's institutions, 142, and fewer academic programs, 23,675, at those institutions in 
this study. These academic programs represent only 6% of all academic programs 
examined.  
Bachelor's institutions may be disproportionally affected by the study's design. In 
compiling the dataset for analysis academic programs were included only from 
institutions which were open the entire length of the study's time period. As discussed in 
the design section, this was done on a theoretical premise that closing an institution was a 
different decision than the purpose of this study and that including an institution that 
closed, and with it every academic program, it would  introduce bias in the survival 
analysis model. Including only institutions open the entire time period studied avoided 
this bias. However, this may have disproportionally impacted  Bachelor's institutions in 
this study. Under circumstances that larger institutions would close academic programs, 
Bachelor's institutions may be more likely to close the entire institution.  
Analysis of results. 
The results of the basic model, without controlling for discipline of academic 
programs, demonstrated that changes in state appropriations have the largest effect on 
bachelor's institutions. The effects of state appropriation changes at research institutions 
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and master's institutions, while present, were quite small. The probability of academic 
program closures at bachelor's institutions are much more dependent on state revenues to 
the institution.  Of all the revenue sources in this study, institutions have the most 
influence over tuition and fees.  Academic programs were much less likely to close when 
tuition went up at research institutions, but especially at bachelor's institutions. Increases 
in federal grants had an outsized effect on program continuation at research institutions, 
and a small effect at master's and bachelor's institutions. Collectively, the biggest loss of 
academic programs was in fiscal year 2003 where more programs closed than any other 
year in the time period studied. This drop was present across research, master's and 
bachelor's institutions.  
When examining only within disciplines with the basic model, it's evident that the 
closure rates within three disciplines are correlated with state funding changes more than 
the other disciplines. Changes in state appropriations are much more likely to help 
academic programs in the Health Sciences, Humanities, and Education disciplines. This 
is relative to the entire sample's low probability of closure, but stands out as relevant to 
these disciplines. Conversely, the probability of closure for academic programs in STEM 
are substantively unchanged with changes in state appropriations. Changes in tuition and 
fees have no measured effect in Health Sciences and Humanities, but academic programs 
in Social Sciences are substantially less likely to close when tuition increases. This effect 
was present to a lesser degree in academic programs of Business and Education, followed 
by Other and STEM.  Collectively, these discipline specific models demonstrated that 
Health Sciences fields are much more likely to continue each year during the time period 
studied. Least likely to survive were the academic disciplines categorized in Other, 
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comprised of varies fields including military science and animal science. This steep drop 
that occurred in 2003 accounts for most of the closed programs that year and explains the 
steep drop off that year saw in the initial model.  
The models with indicator variables were largely the same, but the indicator 
variables do provide a comparison across disciplines of how each contributes to the 
survival of their academic programs. Within Social Sciences, Humanities, and STEM the 
academic programs were less likely to close when compared to the other programs. This 
represents disciplines that were more stable during the time period studied, with the least 
closures in each of them.  
Most insightful, however were the models with measures for state funding 
changes, control variables, and indicator variables for each discipline using effects 
coding. As signaled by the prior model, Social Sciences, Humanities, and STEM 
disciplines were much less likely to close, when holding the remaining variables constant. 
At all institutions in the study, when compared to the average likelihood of closure, 
academic programs in Social Sciences were .47 less likely to close, Humanities academic 
programs were .39 less likely to close, and STEM academic programs were .27 less likely 
to close.   Research, Master's and Bachelor's Institutions each were predicted with similar 
results, but the magnitude was highest in all three disciplines at Master's institutions. 
Conversely, academic programs in Business, Education, Health Sciences, and Other 
disciplines were not more likely to continue than the average likelihood in the sample.   
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Conclusion 
Implications. 
As positioned in the current body of research this study contributes in four major 
ways. The study contributes by identifying environmental variables that stakeholders can 
monitor. It provides a more complex and contrasting perspective to Dickeson's findings 
in 2010. Morgan's stages of budget contraction at HEI (1982) are affirmed by this study. 
Finally, the economic model of HEI advanced by Paulsen is partially supported with this 
study.    
This study contributes to the sparse body of literature addressing academic 
programs in HEI. Its empirical analysis is one of the few articles quantifying how 
academic programs change over time in American higher education. The findings 
demonstrate that academic programs in certain disciplines are less likely to close than in 
other disciplines, but this change in likelihood is still relative to the overall likelihood of 
academic program closures in a given year, which is small. While the likelihood is small, 
it does increase and decrease depending on important variables which stakeholders can 
monitor, including state appropriations, federal grant dollars, and number of graduating 
students in the program.  
The changes over time in academic programs of this study differ from the changes 
over time that Dickeson (2010) noted in his book and shown in Table 2.  The disciplines 
of this study and Dickeson's list are not fully aligned, but of those disciplines that are 
aligned with this study found contrasting outcomes. Business and Education in this study 
were largely aligned in their closure rates, see Figure 10, but in Dickeson's findings 
Business had gained while Education lost over time. The disciplines of Social Sciences 
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had a low closure rate in this study, but Dickeson's findings showed it lost at the second 
highest rate. Finally, changes in Humanities in both this study and Dickeson's findings 
were situated in middle of the other fields. These two studies are not fully comparable, 
but Dickeson's findings are the only empirical work on academic disciplines to which 
approximate comparisons may be drawn.   
Morgan's assertion of HEI experience stages of budget contractions (1982) is 
supported by this study.   To briefly recap, the sequential stages he proposed were: 
slowed growth, temporary contraction, short-term substantial contraction, and long-term 
substantial contraction. Academic program closures were more likely only in the third 
and fourth stages. This study's finding of how infrequently academic programs close is 
supportive of these being only in the later, and most rare stages of HEI responses to 
budget contractions.  
Paulsen's work on the supply and demand of public higher education (2001) is 
partially supported by this study. Paulsen stated that as states increase funding for higher 
education the supply of higher education rises. The findings of this study demonstrated 
that increases in state funding  made academic programs less likely to close and decreases 
in state funding made them more likely to close, all other factors being held constant. 
This is in line with Paulsen's theory that supply of public higher education shifts in 
response to state financial support. The demand side of Paulsen's theory was not 
addressed in this study, however ways of doing so are discussed in the further research 
section.    
  There are implications for stakeholders of each discipline considered in this 
study.   The institution's state appropriations have the biggest effect on Health Sciences, 
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Education, and Humanities. Academic programs in these disciplines are less likely to 
close when state appropriations increase but more likely to close when state 
appropriations decrease. This effect is much smaller for academic programs in the 
disciplines of Social Sciences and Business. In STEM fields the effect is negligible. They 
are least dependent on state appropriations for their probability of closing.  
Further research. 
Multi-level model. 
This study's survival analysis did not take into account the multi-level nature of 
the data. Academic programs are nested within departments, which are nested within 
colleges, which are nested within institutions, which are nested within states.  Decisions 
are made at each of the five levels which affect the lower levels as a collective.  
Future work in this area should employ multi-level modeling to address this issue. 
The five-level model, while ideal, is likely not necessary unless including variable 
measurements from each of those levels. An institutional-level second level would serve 
to largely address the multi-level structure. Most apparent in this study were the changes 
in institutional funding that are attributed to each academic program. A multi-level model 
would allow random effects to occur at the institutional level separate from the academic 
program level. A third level, state, could be considered. However state legislatures and 
higher education governing boards make funding decisions for each institution 
sufficiently separate that it would be measured at the model's institutional level.  
Different predictors in model. 
This research did not account for the duration of an academic program's existence 
due to the constraints of the dataset used. However, the age of an academic program 
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likely will have an effect on its probability of closing. I hypothesize that young academic 
programs are highly unlikely to be cut due to structural and political reasons. A new 
academic program would not be opened if expected to exist for only a few years, and is 
unlikely to be founded during difficult financial times. Further, the faculty who 
established a new program would be on campus and continue to exert their political 
influence to maintain the academic program that they used to establish it. For these 
reasons including a measure of an academic program's age should be considered in future 
work. 
In this same vein, measuring the number of faculty affiliated with an academic 
program may contribute substantial power to the calculated models. Well supported 
academic programs with a dozen faculty members are unlikely to close, while an 
academic program with one affiliated faculty member may be more at risk of closure. 
Further, the departure of an academic program's primary faculty member may contribute 
strongly to a decision to close a program rather than recruit a new faculty member.   
It may be necessary to lag changes in HEI revenues beyond this study's lag of one 
year. As discussed in the interpretations, many of the results are unintuitive when related 
to the budget cycle.  Institutional policies may not allow immediate cutting of academic 
programs the year following year. Further, students enrolled in a program may be 
allowed to complete it and the academic program closed only after the last student 
graduates. These delays may be present in this study's results and could be addressed by 
lagging the revenues two to five years.  
Paulsen's theory of supply and demand for public higher education was partially 
addressed in this study with examining the supply in relation to state financial support. 
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However this study did not consider the demand side of Paulsen's theory. Further 
research should include consideration of the market for graduates from academic 
programs. They could be done through using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The 
Department of Education provides, as a part of the IPEDS Completions dataset and CIP 
codes supporting documentation, a crosswalk table for connecting CIP codes with BLS' 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles. This CIP-DOT connection would enable introducing 
additional variables into the model with employment rates in each field. This would serve 
as an acceptable proxy for academic program market demand.  
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Table 1: Percentage Distribution of Bachelor’s Degrees Conferred, by Field of Study 
 
Field of Study 1970-1971 2006-2007 Net Change 
Humanities 17.1% 17.6% +0.5% 
Social and behavioral sciences 23.0 16.7 -6.3 
Natural sciences 9.8 7.3 -2.5 
Computer sciences and engineering 6.3 8.2 +1.9 
Education 21.0 6.9 -14.1 
Business 13.7 21.5 +7.8 
Other fields 9.1 219 +12.8 
Source: (Dickeson, 2010)    
 
 
 
Table 2: Causes of Decline in Public Organizations  (Morgan, 1982) 
 
 Internal External 
Political 
 
 
Political vulnerability 
high level of precariousness which 
limits organization's capacity to 
resist budget decrements and 
demands to contract 
Problem depletion 
war mobilization organizations; 
polio research Political entropy, 
i.e., decline in the willingness of 
the body politic to support the 
organization's claims for needed 
resources. 
 
Economic/
Technical 
 
 
Organizational entropy 
declining performance, high cost 
services, inflexibility 
Environmental entropy 
declining enrollment bases in 
city schools, market and 
technological shifts, mineral 
depletion 
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Figure 1: Changes Optimal Allocation of Higher Education Resources 
Supply and Demand Curves (Adapted from Paulsen, 2001) 
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Figure 2: Applied Example of Hopkin’s Production Function.  
Adapted from Hopkins, 1990. 
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Figure 3: Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard formula: 
! !! = !!!!!!!!!  
 
Figure 4: Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor function: 
!(!!) = ! !! − !!!!!!!!! ! 
 
Figure 5: Model Equation: !!"#!! = !!!"#!! + !""#$ℎ!"#!"#$!!!"!! + !""#$ℎ!"#!"#$!!"!! !+ !!"#$%&'('$ℎ!"#!$!%&!'(ℎ!"#$%!&!"!!"!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!+ log !"#$%#&'!!"#!! + !"#$%#&'(!!"#! "#!!"#$%#&'!!"#!!+ !"#ℎ!"#$%$#&$'(!"# + !!"#$%&"#!!!" !!+!"#$%&!!!" !+ !!"#!! 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Subsets of Carnegie Classifications, using Model with Predictors
All Research Institutions Master's Institutions Bachelor's Institutions
% Change in State 
Appropriations
0.00006***
(b= 0.125)
0.00171***
(b= 0.256)
0.00007***
(b= 0.187)
0.00589***
(b= 36.337)
Bachelor's Degree Program 0.14401***
(b= 0.387)
0.11417***
(b= 0.292)
0.18980***
(b= 0.531)
0.73416***
(b= 1.185)
Program Graduates (Log) 0.60559***
(b= 4.428)
0.60647***
(b= 4.382)
0.66192***
(b= 5.087)
0.51383***
(b= 3.239)
Program Graduates per 
HEI's Graduates
-4.15022   
(b=-0.545)
-11.46934   
(b=-0.678)
-4.83061   
(b=-0.729)
-2.55065   
(b=-0.786)
Land Grant Institution -0.19026   
(b=-0.444)
-0.18899   
(b=-0.478)
-0.31393   
(b=-0.354)
0.30125***
(b= 0.324)
Medical Institution -0.13847   
(b=-0.337)
-0.15978   
(b=-0.412)
0.20807***
(b= 0.160)
NA   
% Change in Tuition -0.00039   
(b=-0.031)
0.33338***
(b= 0.141)
-0.00036   
(b=-0.053)
0.54661***
(b= 1.169)
% Change in Federal 
Appropriations
-0.00034*  
(b=-0.001)
-0.01851   
(b=-0.064)
0.01117***
(b= 0.062)
-2.18005   
(b=-0.745)
% Change in Local 
Appropriations
-0.06844   
(b=-0.044)
0.03616***
(b= 0.023)
-0.22615   
(b=-0.167)
-0.75098   
(b=-0.317)
% Change in Federal 
Grants
0.12635***
(b= 7.482)
0.33309***
(b= 0.554)
0.08677***
(b= 9.405)
0.07157***
(b= 0.180)
% Change in State Grants -0.00273   
(b=-8.083)
-0.09831   
(b=-0.427)
-0.00217   
(b=-11.775)
0.00103***
(b= 0.130)
% Change in Local Grants 0.00001***
(b= 0.087)
0.00001***
(b= 0.111)
0.00064***
(b= 1.475)
-0.00007   
(b=-0.152)
% Change in Private Gifts 0.00033***
(b= 0.020)
0.00059***
(b= 0.024)
-0.00003*  
(b=-0.003)
-0.00540   
(b=-0.171)
% Change in Auxiliary Rev 0.01219***
(b= 0.463)
0.01859***
(b= 0.120)
0.00945***
(b= 0.652)
0.12616***
(b= 0.389)
% Change in Hospital and 
Ind. Rev
0.00336***
(b= 0.135)
0.00158***
(b= 0.021)
0.00390***
(b= 0.273)
0.01944***
(b= 0.481)
R2 0.02096 0.02231 0.01906 0.02041
Closures 14,740 9,397 4,368 983
Observations 411,738 240,798 147,637 23,675
HEI 574 166 268 142
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Table 6: Model with Predictors and Disciplines
All Research Institutions Master's Institutions Bachelor's Institutions
Humanities 0.39025***
(b= 1.175)
0.36940***
(b= 1.076)
0.44548***
(b= 1.452)
0.30274***
(b= 0.847)
Social Sciences 0.47431***
(b= 1.369)
0.41255***
(b= 1.146)
0.58875***
(b= 1.850)
0.53951***
(b= 1.462)
Business -0.26443   
(b=-0.681)
-0.23418   
(b=-0.560)
-0.24884   
(b=-0.721)
-0.39678   
(b=-1.082)
Education -0.14665   
(b=-0.436)
-0.14780   
(b=-0.400)
-0.19826   
(b=-0.692)
-0.10028   
(b=-0.272)
Health Sciences -0.50727   
(b=-1.263)
-0.51742   
(b=-1.254)
-0.52346   
(b=-1.398)
-0.37153   
(b=-0.846)
STEM 0.27094***
(b= 0.902)
0.26278***
(b= 0.878)
0.29918***
(b= 0.995)
0.24666***
(b= 0.766)
Other -0.21715   
(b=-0.654)
-0.14533   
(b=-0.423)
-0.36284   
(b=-1.183)
-0.22032   
(b=-0.617)
% Change in State 
Appropriations
0.00006***
(b= 0.127)
0.00166***
(b= 0.248)
0.00006***
(b= 0.179)
0.00732***
(b= 45.151)
Bachelor's Degree Program 0.09409***
(b= 0.253)
0.07181***
(b= 0.183)
0.07956***
(b= 0.222)
0.54500***
(b= 0.879)
Program Graduates (Log) 0.62844***
(b= 4.595)
0.62410***
(b= 4.510)
0.68448***
(b= 5.260)
0.52633***
(b= 3.318)
Program Graduates per 
HEI's Graduates
-3.70167   
(b=-0.486)
-9.30107   
(b=-0.550)
-4.18745   
(b=-0.632)
-2.10652   
(b=-0.649)
Land Grant Institution -0.19372   
(b=-0.452)
-0.18550   
(b=-0.469)
-0.24347   
(b=-0.274)
0.30177***
(b= 0.325)
Medical Institution -0.15698   
(b=-0.383)
-0.14141   
(b=-0.365)
0.19154***
(b= 0.147)
NA   
% Change in Tuition -0.00051   
(b=-0.041)
0.27498***
(b= 0.116)
-0.00050   
(b=-0.073)
0.55901***
(b= 1.195)
% Change in Federal 
Appropriations
0.00047***
(b= 0.002)
-0.01971   
(b=-0.069)
0.01235***
(b= 0.068)
-2.32076   
(b=-0.793)
% Change in Local 
Appropriations
-0.06842   
(b=-0.044)
0.02893***
(b= 0.018)
-0.20332   
(b=-0.150)
-0.74613   
(b=-0.315)
% Change in Federal 
Grants
0.13258***
(b= 7.851)
0.34498***
(b= 0.573)
0.09475***
(b= 10.271)
0.06463***
(b= 0.162)
% Change in State Grants -0.00287   
(b=-8.517)
-0.09672   
(b=-0.420)
-0.00232   
(b=-12.572)
0.00097***
(b= 0.122)
% Change in Local Grants 0.00001***
(b= 0.077)
0.00001***
(b= 0.100)
0.00052***
(b= 1.204)
-0.00008   
(b=-0.164)
% Change in Private Gifts 0.00031***
(b= 0.018)
0.00083***
(b= 0.034)
-0.00018   
(b=-0.016)
-0.00708   
(b=-0.223)
% Change in Auxiliary Rev 0.01426***
(b= 0.542)
0.01094***
(b= 0.071)
0.01243***
(b= 0.857)
0.12679***
(b= 0.391)
% Change in Hospital and 
Ind. Rev
0.00336***
(b= 0.135)
0.00148***
(b= 0.020)
0.00425***
(b= 0.298)
0.02040***
(b= 0.505)
R2 0.02440 0.02564 0.02279 0.02379
Closures 14,740 9,397 4,368 983
Observations 411,738 240,798 147,637 23,675
HEI 574 166 268 142
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Chapter 3. Changes in Revenues for Higher Education and  
their Differential Consequences for Institutional Expenditure Areas   
Clinton M. Stephens 
Introduction 
For the past forty years in the United States the support of public higher education 
institutions has ebbed among the state legislatures (Archibald and Feldman, 2006; Kane 
and Orszag, 2003, State Higher Education Finance FY 2010, 2010; Toutkoushian and 
Hollis 1998; Weerts and Ronca, 2006). States peaked in their fiscal support for public 
universities in the 1970s. As measured by state appropriations per $1,000 of personal 
income, by 1979 36 states had hit their highest support for higher education and began a 
decline in support (Archibald and Feldman, 2006). The remaining states followed soon 
afterward. This gradual decline has not come evenly. Higher education has served as the 
"balance wheel" for state spending, where in times of higher state revenues funds 
increase and in times of lower revenues funds decrease, with funding changing 
disproportionately to the change in state revenue (Delaney and Doyle, 2011).  
The Great Recession that began in 2008 severely curtailed tax revenues in 49 
states (State Higher Education Finance, 2011). With these reduced revenues state 
spending shrank significantly with large cuts hitting education. In the 2009 and 2010 
fiscal years, 44 states cut funding for higher education (State Support for Higher 
Education Database, 2010). For only these two years cuts were as high at 37% (in 
Massachusetts). Nationwide, funding for high education dropped from 2009 to 2010 by 
4.5% (State Higher Education Finance, 2011).  
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Understanding how these funding cuts are absorbed by institutions is critical to 
inform how they effect public higher education. Much work has been done on how 
changes in state appropriations change tuition revenues (Greene, 1994; Griswold, 1996; 
Koshal & Koshal, 2000), student financial aid (Doyle, 2009; Doyle, Delaney, Naughton, 
2009; Perna, 2008), and even its effect on endowment donations (Cheslock & 
Gianneschi, 2008). However no known literature discusses the changes in expenditures 
within higher education institutions due to funding cuts.  
Purpose. 
This research attempts to contribute to the literature on state funding of public 
institutions and specifically the effects of changes in state funding on institutional 
expenditures by expenditure area. Based on the findings of Archibald and Feldman 
(2008) that state funding began dropping in 1990 and has continued to slide downward, 
this research will examine the time period from 1990 to 2009. While multiple funding 
sources and multiple expenditure areas are of interest in this research, this paper will 
focus on examining changes in state funding and changes in tuition revenue on major 
expenditures areas. To this end, this paper will seek to answer two research questions. 
First, for public research institutions, what effect do changes in state funding have on 
institutions' changes in spending patterns for major expenditure areas? Second, for public 
research institutions, what effect do changes in tuition revenues have on institutions' 
changes in spending patterns for major expenditure areas?  
For the purposes of this study state funding is considered annual operating funds 
allocated by state and local governments for use within the designated fiscal year. This 
excludes state funding for capital expenditures or other one-time expenses. Tuition 
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revenues for this paper are considered net tuition dollars received in exchange for 
education, this is after tuition discounts and intra-institutional scholarships are applied. 
This excludes payments for other services like housing, food, or non-credit instruction. 
See the methods section on revenues for a full definition of state funding and tuition 
revenues.  
Conceptual Framework 
Cited frequently in literature on higher education finance since publication, 
Bowen in 1980 outlined the processes through which higher education institutions (HEI) 
raise and spend their funds. His work serves as part of the conceptual framework for this 
research, including the multiple sources of HEI revenues and his revenue theory of cost. 
Further, Paulsen's work (2001) on the supply and demand market of higher education 
provides a framework for understanding state subsidies to higher education and students' 
willingness to pay tuition revenues. Finally, Dickeson (2010) observed recent shifts in 
HEI revenue sources and the difficulty with which many HEI establish and act on 
strategic priorities.  
There are multiple key sources of funds for HEI, Bowen observed "no single 
social decision-making authority provides the resources for higher education or regulates 
the flow of these resources" (Bowen, 1980, p. 118). These sources include individual 
students' tuition and fees; federal, state and municipal appropriations; donors' gifts; and 
endowment income. These collective decisions by millions of individuals determine the 
funding for higher education. Annual changes in these decisions are typically in small 
increments or decrements (Bowen, 1980). Each institution, in turn, decides how to 
allocate these funds internally.  
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Bowen (1980) advanced "the revenue theory of cost" which posits that in HEI can 
adjust expenses to match the funds available. He asserts this short-run theory is 
particularly applicable in state-funded HEI. When funding increases, further expenditures 
are made. Conversely when funding decreases, expenditures are cut. This differs from 
for-profit industries where loans and credit enable a business to spend more than its 
revenues in a given year and where surplus revenues are kept as profits.  
Paulsen (2001) explained that demand for public education is driven by both 
public and private sources, illustrated in the supply and demand curves of Figure 1. These 
changes in demand affect institutions through changes in revenues, primarily from state 
appropriations and tuition. These changes in revenues cause the institution to adjust 
expenditures.  
Society has an interest in the "external or public benefits generated from higher 
education" (Paulsen, 2001, p. 108). Such societal benefit drives the public to desire more 
of its members to obtain higher education. In turn, this increases the societal demand for 
higher education. The private sources of demand come from individuals who desire to 
invest in their higher education. But these individuals do not take into account the 
external societal benefits of obtaining higher education, and therefore are only willing to 
pay the tuition rate for which they perceive they will privately benefit more than the cost 
of tuition. Heller stipulated that four-year public higher education institutions 
accommodate all students meeting admissions requirements who wish to enroll (Heller, 
1999) and that the marginal cost for each gain or loss of one student is the same to the 
institution. Therefore institutions' are willing to supply sufficient higher education to 
meet the private demand of students willing to pay the tuition necessary to cover the 
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institutions' marginal costs. This creates a gap between overall demand for higher 
education–combined public and private demand–and the supply from higher education 
institutions. The societal demand can be addressed through public policy through 
providing public subsidies. Paulsen asserted that when state legislatures allocate funds to 
the public institutions, the institutions' marginal costs are reduced. When this decrease in 
marginal costs is reflected through decreases in tuition rates, more students are willing to 
pay the new rate for which they perceive they will privately derive more benefit than the 
new cost of tuition.  
-- insert Figure 1 about here -- 
Conversely, decreases in allocation of state funds to public institutions results in 
increases in institutions' marginal costs. This increased marginal cost reflected in new 
tuition rates causes fewer students to perceive greater private benefits than the new 
tuition cost. Therefore a marginal decline occurs in students obtaining higher education. 
Paulsen asserted that when fewer students seek higher education, the supply from public 
institutions also is reduced to match the new demand.  
Writing on the need for academic priorities, Dickeson (2010) concurred with 
Bowen's work, stating Bowen was accurate 30 years later. Dickeson asserted that 
substantial tuition increases have been the primary source of additional funding for 
institutions, exceeding measures of inflation by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), Higher 
Education Price Index (HEPI), and the Higher Education Cost Adjustment (HECA). 
Dickeson took particular issue with these rises in tuition revenue because of a recent 
report (Wellman, Desrochers, and Lenihan, 2009) that indicated rising students' tuition 
but institutions spending less on instruction.  
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Dickeson (2010) argued that institutions have much less control over rising 
expenses. In lean budget years, caused by reduced state appropriations, he described cost 
cutting as untargeted and haphazard through means such as deferring expenditures, 
simply not filling positions, and making across-the-board cuts (p. 3). These are short-term 
efforts to reduce expenses, without regard to priorities and strategic decision-making. 
Dickeson summarized "institutions have not made the tough decisions about adapting to 
lower subsidies" (p. 4).  
Methodology 
 This study is broken into three parts. First is an examination of institution 
expenditures between 1990 and 2009. This looked at how institutional expenditures are 
distributed over major functional areas and how this distribution has shifted over the 20 
years in the study period. Second, taking a more statistical approach to changes over 
time, a univariate growth curve model, discussed in the next section, was calculated for 
each expenditure area over the period of the study. These growth curves reveal trends in 
higher education that are present at the institutional level but may be masked when 
examining aggregate summary data over a set of institutions. Third, a multi-level model 
was constructed with percent change in revenue sources as predictor variables for 
changes in institutional spending patterns. This model is the most nuanced of the three 
models constructed in this study.  
Growth curve modeling. 
This research sought to examine changes in expenditures over several years or, in 
other words, changes in evenly-spaced repeated observations of the same entities over a 
fixed duration of time. Latent growth curve modeling is an appropriate statistical 
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technique for such analyses (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). This technique provides 
statistics that measure the rate of change over time in a dependent variable of interest, the 
funding, and statistics on the fit of the theoretical model with the observed measurements. 
Three statistics will be of most interest in this study: the intercept, the slope, and the 
intercept-slope covariance. The intercept statistic provides an estimate of the first-year 
ratio of total expenditures on instruction. The slope is an estimate of the rate of change 
between years. Finally, the covariance statistic gives insight into how much the initial 
level, the intercept, affects the rate of change between years, the slope. These statistics 
together provide measurements of how instructional expenditure ratios are trending over 
time. 
Growth curve modeling was first used in the mid-1960’s in the biological sciences 
(Pothoff & Roy, 1964; Rao, 1965) and have since been adapted to social sciences (Kreft 
& Leeuw, 1998). This technique can be applied using several different approaches 
including repeated-measures modeling, hierarchical linear modeling, and structural 
equation modeling (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Relative to each other, each of these has 
its benefits and limitations. 
This research used the structural equation modeling approach to apply growth 
curves. Using this framework a wider range of covariant variables can be used (Willett & 
Sayer, 1994). The primary limitation of using this approach is the necessity to have the 
same number of evenly-spaced repeated observations per entity. The dataset used in this 
research conform to this limitation. Each entity was a higher education institution and 
each observation within an institution was its ratio of annual expenditures on instruction. 
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Data. 
The data of interest for this study was collected by the Department of Education's 
National Center for Educational Statistics as part of the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS). All institutions participating in any federal financial 
assistance programs authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education Act are required to 
complete all IPEDS surveys. Failure to comply subjects an institution to fines or 
jeopardized eligibility for participation in federal financial assistance programs (Statutory 
Requirements for Reporting IPEDS Data, 2011). This generates a near-universal response 
rate to the surveys and provides a census of U.S. higher education institutions every year.  
A subset of the dataset was made for this study to include all four-year public 
higher education institutions that existed for the 20 years spanning 1990-2009, 
inclusively. Public, four-year institutions with a Carnegie classification of research 
universities are the focus of this study. The issues examined in this study are relevant to 
two-year institutions and to non-research institutions but they are outside the scope of this 
research. Only institutions that existed in the dataset for all 20 years were included. For 
this study, there were a total of 165 institutions represented in the dataset.  
The IPEDS finance survey is collected annually between December and April for 
data pertaining to the prior fiscal year's revenues and expenses (IPEDS Survey 
Components And Data Collection And Dissemination Cycle, 2011). During the period of 
study there were changes in the reporting forms used to collect finance data, moving to 
the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) starting in 2002. For two years 
using the old or the new form was optional, then the new form was required starting in 
2004 (IPEDS Finance Data FASB and GASB, 2011). Reporting of the data of interest, 
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state funding levels, for this study did not change substantively across the old and new 
reporting forms. During data cleaning care was taken to account for the optional years; 
the data of interest was collapsed from the old and new formats into common variables 
for analysis. 
All IPEDS data is structured and provided as an individual year in which it was 
collected. To analyze any IPEDS data longitudinally, the provided individual-year 
datasets must be merged together into a common dataset. This is aided by the use of a 
unique record identifier, “unitid,” that is largely consistent across individual-year 
datasets.  
However in a large dataset such as IPEDS even infrequent errors can accumulate 
to effect many institutions' longitudinal records in this 20-year study. In merging multiple 
year datasets together sequentially, an error in one institutional record’s unique identifier 
in a single year causes that record’s prior and subsequent years to not match. This results 
in the record’s longitudinal data remaining disconnected at the year of the error. Such a 
record is indistinguishable from one institution’s closing and another institution’s 
opening. This error, multiplied over many institutions and then again over every year in 
the longitudinal dataset quickly reduces the dataset’s accuracy and usability for 
meaningful longitudinal analysis. 
To counter these problems with longitudinal analysis of IPEDS data, several steps 
were taken to verify and correct for mismatches. The matching of institutions was done in 
five waves, with verification steps after each wave to ensure correct matches. Each wave 
matched on multiple variables in the two datasets, including the unique identifier, ZIP 
code, state, and institution name. In the first wave the most rigorous matching criteria 
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were met, the remaining unmatched institutions then entered the next wave with slightly 
less-strict matching on a smaller institution set. After each wave the matches were 
verified by comparing other variables and ensuring expected values for institution name, 
changes in student body size, and changes in faculty member counts.  
These matchings were done for each pair of sequential years first. There were rare 
cases of institutions not existing in the dataset for one or more years, then re-appearing. 
To address this missing data issue, matching was done across multiple years when an 
adjacent year dataset did not contain an institution. This allowed such an institution to 
still be correctly identified across the longitudinal dataset. Collectively, these steps 
greatly reduced the data integrity problems in the IPEDS dataset created by mis-matching 
errors, failed matches, and missing data. Reducing these issues provided a more reliable 
longitudinal dataset for analysis. 
Expenditure variables. 
For this research the 12 expenditure areas requested in the IPEDS surveys were 
used. Institutions report these expenditure areas desegregated by salaries and wages, 
benefits, operation and maintenance, depreciation, and interest. This research examined 
only the aggregated sum for each expenditure area. Table 1 has descriptions of the 12 
expenditure areas from the IPEDS Finance Survey Materials (2011). These variables 
exclude changes in assets or debts. Data are reported directly by the institutions and 
matches what was reported as total operating expenses on the institution's general 
purpose financial statement.  
-- Insert Table 1 about here -- 
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Revenue variables. 
This study used multiple sources of revenues as independent variables to predict 
changes in expenditure patterns. Institutions report revenues in 29 IPEDS categories. The 
categories of interest were identified and aggregated into seven revenue variables. To 
create these variables, this work closely followed the work of the Delta Cost Project 
(2008) in mapping the 29 IPEDS categories to aggregate variables. Following are 
descriptions of the seven variables and their comprising categories in the IPEDS Finance 
Survey (2011). 
"Net tuition" revenues are the tuition and fee revenues assessed of students for 
educational activities, not including auxiliary services feeds. This variable is reported 
directly by institutions with the exclusion of tuition or fee discounts and allowances. It 
therefore represents the actual net income from students' tuition and fees.  
"Federal funding" is an aggregate variable. It combines the following three IPEDS 
variables. "Federal appropriations" are revenues directed to the institution through 
legislative acts, and excludes grants and contracts for specific programs. "Federal 
operating grants and contracts" are revenues from federal agencies for specific research 
projects. "Federal non-operating grants" are revenues from federal agencies provided on a 
non-exchange basis, including Pell grants but excluding student loans. Funds from the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) are not included here, but under 
"other" revenues.  
"State and local funding" is an aggregate variable. It combines the following six 
IPEDS variables from both state and local government funding sources. "State 
appropriations" are all revenues received through acts of state legislative bodies, 
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excluding grants and contracts. "State operating grants and contracts" are revenues from 
state agencies for specific research projects. "State non-operating grants" are revenues 
from state agencies on a non-exchange basis, not including capital projects. "Local 
appropriations" are revenues from property or other taxes directly for the institution by 
any government below the state level. "Local government operating grants and contracts" 
are revenues from local agencies specifically for research projects. "Local government 
non-operating grants" are revenues from local agencies on a non-exchange basis, 
excluding capital projects. 
"Gifts" is an IPEDS variable reported directly by the institution as "Gifts, 
including contributions from affiliated organizations." This revenue includes private 
donations and gifts from affiliated organizations, excluding gifts classified as additions to 
a permanent endowment.  
"Investments" is an IPEDS variable reported directly by the institutions as 
"Investment income." This revenue includes all gains and losses from held investments, 
interest, dividends, rents, and royalties.  
"Auxiliaries" is an IPEDS variable reported directly by the institutions as "Sales 
and services of auxiliary enterprises." This includes revenues generated from self-
supporting operations that charge a fee to students or staff, including residence halls and 
food services, it is a net revenue after subtracting discounts and allowances.  
"Hospital" is an IPEDS variable reported directly by the institutions as "Sales and 
services of hospitals." This includes net revenues for hospitals and clinics affiliated with 
the institution, after subtracting patient allowances. For institutions with hospitals–and 
accompanying hospital services expenditures–this variable controls for these connected 
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revenues and expenditures. Institutions without hospitals are measured at zero and are not 
effected by this control variable's regression coefficient.  
"Independent" is an IPEDS variable reported directly by the institutions as 
"Independent operations." This includes all revenues associated with activities that are 
not related to the institutional mission, such as federally funded research and 
development centers.  
"Other" is an IPEDS variable reported directly by the institutions as "Other 
operating sources." This variable includes any sources not previously included. Of 
particular note for this study, this variable includes the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funding. 
Variable transformations. 
To answer the research questions of this study the revenue and expense variables 
were transformed to the forms needed. These transformations of the 12 expenditure area 
expense variables measured annual rates of change in their percentage of the institutions' 
expenditures; and the seven sources of revenue variables were transformed to measure 
their positive and negative annual percentage change. 
For the dependent variables, expenditure area priorities were operationalized as 
the percentage of each expenditure area of the total institutional expenditures. This 
provided a percentage for each expenditure area of the institution's total expenditures. 
Following this, changes in expenditure area priorities were operationalized as the year-
over-year difference in the expenditure area percentages. The resulting variable was used 
as the dependent variable in equations for each expenditure area.  
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For the independent variables, the seven variables measuring sources of revenues 
were also transformed into percent change from the previous year. This gave a percentage 
change for each source of revenue. As discussed in the theoretical perspective, positive 
and negative changes in revenue sources may cause different decisions in their allocation 
to expenditure areas. Therefore each revenue source was split into two variables–positive 
revenue change and negative revenue change. In each year when revenue changes in one 
direction, the other variable is coded as zero. This results in 18 variables for sources of 
revenue in the model.  
Careful consideration was given to the potential multicollinearity in the split 
variables due to these transformations. Correlations were calculated for each combination 
of the revenue variables and reported in Table 2. The strongest correlation was 0.175 
between every pair of revenue variables, well below a threshold for concern. The split 
variables are highly independent. Throughout the correlation matrix the strongest 
correlation was 0.393 between positive state funding and positive private gifts. Again, 
this correlation is not strong enough to warrant concern of failing to identify the model 
when calculated. This correlation may likely be due to the common economic 
environments in which both the state government and private donors operate.  
-- insert Table 2 about here --  
Results 
Expenditure distributions results. 
The first set of results calculated were the annual percent of expenditures in each 
expenditure area, reported in Table 3. For this calculation the percentage of expenditures 
on each expenditure area were calculated for each institution. Then these data were 
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averaged across the 165 institutions. The results reported represent the annual average 
percent of total expenditures in each expenditure area by all institutions in the sample. 
Spending on independent operations and other operations, while reported, was less than 
1% for all years and are omitted in this section and in the tables.  
-- insert Table 3 about here -- 
For the first year of the study research institutions spent 32.42% on instruction, 
12.42% on auxiliary enterprises, and 11.96% research—the three highest areas. A second 
tier of expenditure areas was made up by academic support, institutional support, 
operations maintenance with 7.98%, 7.31%, and 7.11% respectively. The next tier of 
expenditure area funding comprised student scholarships, public service, hospital 
services, student services, with 5.58%, 4.64%, 4.28% and 3.98% respectively. 
For the final year of the study, 2009, research institutions spent 29.84% on 
instruction, 14.60% on research, and 10.68% on auxiliary enterprises. A second tier of 
spending on academic support and institutional support made up 8.03% and 7.34% 
respectively. The next tier of funding comprised public service, student services, 
scholarships, hospital services, and operations maintenance, with 4.91% 4.51%, 3.95%, 
3.62%, and 3.46% respectively.  
Collectively, research institutions were shifting toward more funding on research 
and less funding on operations maintenance and on instruction. Across these 21 years the 
largest shift was a 3.65% decrease in operations maintenance. This was followed by a 
2.64% increase in spending on research and a 2.58% decrease in spending on instruction. 
Smaller shifts were seen in gains among academic support, student services, institutional 
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support. Smaller shifts were also seen in losses among scholarships, auxiliary enterprises, 
and hospital services.  
-- insert Table 4 about here -- 
-- insert Table 5 about here -- 
Univariate growth curve model results. 
To further explore these shifts in expenditures, univariate growth curve (UGC) 
models were calculated to identify the level and slope of each expenditure area and to 
generate the trends over time of all institutions studied (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). See 
Figure 3 for a diagram of the model. To account for unmeasured relationships between 
sequential years auto-correlation was used to correlate the error terms of each funding 
variable. All models were calculated using the Maximum Likelihood method in the R 
software package with the Lavaan add-on package. The models all successfully 
overidentified, each with 206 degrees of freedom. The results are reported in Table 6, 
along with each model's Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 
(1973), Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA), and chi-squared values. Interpretations of these fit indices are 
done based on the work of Bollen (1989); Raudenbush and Bryk (2002); and Chen, 
Curran and Bollen (2008). 
-- insert Figure 2 about here --  
-- insert Figure 3 about here --  
-- insert Table 6 about here -- 
This modeling is particularly useful because it uses percentages at each 
institution, regardless of the funding dollars. Therefore institutions that have substantially 
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larger budgets are measured with the same weight as institutions with smaller budgets. 
Further, using latent growth curves to examine the changes over time allow fitting a 
linear line to each expenditure area that represents the shifts in percentage funding over 
time. These lines are shown in Figure 4. 
-- insert Figure 4 about here --  
For expenditures on instruction the 20-year trend is decreasing by 0.130 per year. 
With an AIC of 10,287, TLI of 0.921, and SRMR 0.057 it moderately fits the data of the 
sample. This slope coefficient can be interpreted in the intercept's units of 32.167% as 
spending on instruction decreasing by 4.182% of institutions' total expenditures.  
For expenditures on research the 20-year trend increased by .147 per year. With 
an AIC of 8,527, TLI of 0.934, and SRMR 0.028 it is one of the best fitted UGC models. 
This slope coefficient can be interpreted in the intercept's units of 12.049% as spending 
on research increasing by 1.771% of institutions' total expenditures. 
For expenditures on student services the 20-year trend is increasing by .040 per 
year. With an AIC of 4,462, TLI of 0.891 and SRMR 0.063 it moderately fits the students 
services data of the sample. This slope coefficient can be interpreted in the intercept's 
units of 3.792% as spending on research increasing by 0.15% of institutions' total 
expenditures.  
For expenditures on operation maintenance, scholarships, and auxiliary 
enterprises, the 20-year trend is decreasing by 0.059, 0.200, and 0.104 respectively. With 
the AIC, TLI, and SRMR values reported in Table 6 the UGC models loosely fit these 
expenditure areas' data in the sample. The remaining expenditure areas for public service, 
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academic support, institutional support, and hospital services saw no statistically 
significant slopes in their percentage of total funding over the 20-year period. 
Multi-level model results. 
To examine these shifts in expenditure patterns more closely, models were 
constructed to measure how changes in revenue from major revenue sources correlate 
with the subsequent expenditures in each area. As discussed in the design section, the 
regression model includes predictors with variables for each revenue source transformed 
into annual percent change and split into two variables for positive change and negative 
change. For each split variable with a value the opposing variable was given a value of 
zero to cancel out the term in those observations.  
Finally, a two-level multivariate regression was constructed to account for nesting 
the effects of each year within each institution. The above model was the first-level 
equation for each year within a HEI. The second-level equation was for each HEI and 
included indicator variables for whether it was a land grant institution and whether the 
institution awarded medical degrees. The results of this multi-level model (MLM) 
regression are reported in Table 7. Discussed here are only the variables that were 
statistically significant at the p < 0.05 levels and with a coefficients interpreted as a 
change in expenditure proportion of total expenditures greater than +/- 0.1%. For the 
median total operating expenditures in 2009 of the institutions in the dataset this change 
is equivalent to $1,079,412.  
 -- insert Table 7 about here -- 
The model regressed on changes in instruction expenditures as a percent of total 
expenditures had two significant predictor variables. Decreases in Federal funding by 1% 
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from the prior year were correlated with a change in instruction expenditures by +0.082% 
of total expenditures (p < 0.05), which for the median expenditures on instruction 
represents a change of $257,153. Decreases in state and local funding by 1% from the 
prior year were correlated with a change in instruction expenditures by +0.344% of total 
expenditures (p < 0.001), which for the median expenditures on instruction represents a 
change of $1,080,561.  
For the model regressed on changes in research expenditures as a percent of total 
expenditures, seven predictor variables were significant. Decreases in tuition and fees 
revenue by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in research 
expenditures by -0.125% of total expenditures (p < 0.001), which for the median 
expenditures on research represents a change of $-162,753. Increases in Federal funding 
by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in research expenditures by 
+0.007% of total expenditures (p < 0.001), which for the median expenditures on 
research represents a change of $9,364. Decreases in Federal funding by 1% from the 
prior year were correlated with a change in research expenditures by -0.026% of total 
expenditures (p < 0.001), which for the median expenditures on research represents a 
change of $-33,552. Decreases in state and local funding by 1% from the prior year were 
correlated with a change in research expenditures by +0.051% of total expenditures (p < 
0.001), which for the median expenditures on research represents a change of $65,913. 
Increases in auxiliary enterprises revenue by 1% from the prior year were correlated with 
a change in research expenditures by +0.001% of total expenditures (p < 0.01), which for 
the median expenditures on research represents a change of $1,547. Decreases in 
auxiliary enterprises revenue by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in 
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research expenditures by +0.011% of total expenditures (p < 0.01), which for the median 
expenditures on research represents a change of $14,136. Decreases in hospital revenue 
by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in research expenditures by 
+0.019% of total expenditures (p < 0.001), which for the median expenditures on 
research represents a change of $25,106.  
The model regressed on changes in public service expenditures as a percent of 
total expenditures had two significant predictor variables. Increases in tuition and fees 
revenue by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in public service 
expenditures by -0.005% of total expenditures (p < 0.05), which for the median 
expenditures on public service represents a change of $-1,787. Increases in Federal 
funding by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in public service 
expenditures by +0.002% of total expenditures (p < 0.05), which for the median 
expenditures on public service represents a change of $882.  
For the model regressed on changes in academic support expenditures as a percent 
of total expenditures, four predictor variables were significant. Increases in tuition and 
fees revenue by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in academic 
support expenditures by -0.017% of total expenditures (p < 0.001), which for the median 
expenditures on academic support represents a change of $-13,754. Decreases in Federal 
funding by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in academic support 
expenditures by +0.028% of total expenditures (p < 0.01), which for the median 
expenditures on academic support represents a change of $22,257. Decreases in state and 
local funding by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in academic 
support expenditures by +0.176% of total expenditures (p < 0.001), which for the median 
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expenditures on academic support represents a change of $141,634. Decreases in private 
gifts and contracts by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in academic 
support expenditures by -0.007% of total expenditures (p < 0.01), which for the median 
expenditures on academic support represents a change of $-5,807.  
The model regressed on changes in student services expenditures as a percent of 
total expenditures had five significant predictor variables. Increases in tuition and fees 
revenue by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in student services 
expenditures by -0.005% of total expenditures (p < 0.05), which for the median 
expenditures on student services represents a change of $-2,020. Increases in Federal 
funding by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in student services 
expenditures by -0.003% of total expenditures (p < 0.001), which for the median 
expenditures on student services represents a change of $-1,391. Decreases in Federal 
funding by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in student services 
expenditures by +0.010% of total expenditures (p < 0.05), which for the median 
expenditures on student services represents a change of $4,406. Decreases in state and 
local funding by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in student services 
expenditures by +0.066% of total expenditures (p < 0.001), which for the median 
expenditures on student services represents a change of $28,426. Decreases in auxiliary 
enterprises revenue by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in student 
services expenditures by +0.006% of total expenditures (p < 0.05), which for the median 
expenditures on student services represents a change of $2,456.  
For the model regressed on changes in institutional support expenditures as a 
percent of total expenditures, three predictor variables were significant. Increases in 
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tuition and fees revenue by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in 
institutional support expenditures by -0.011% of total expenditures (p < 0.001), which for 
the median expenditures on institutional support represents a change of $-7,518. 
Decreases in Federal funding by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in 
institutional support expenditures by +0.020% of total expenditures (p < 0.01), which for 
the median expenditures on institutional support represents a change of $14,186. 
Decreases in state and local funding by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a 
change in institutional support expenditures by +0.078% of total expenditures (p < 
0.001), which for the median expenditures on institutional support represents a change of 
$55,976.  
The model regressed on changes in operational maintenance expenditures as a 
percent of total expenditures had three significant predictor variables. Increases in tuition 
and fees revenue by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in operational 
maintenance expenditures by -0.010% of total expenditures (p < 0.05), which for the 
median expenditures on operational maintenance represents a change of $-3,150. 
Decreases in Federal funding by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in 
operational maintenance expenditures by +0.019% of total expenditures (p < 0.05), which 
for the median expenditures on operational maintenance represents a change of $5,665. 
Decreases in state and local funding by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a 
change in operational maintenance expenditures by +0.142% of total expenditures (p < 
0.001), which for the median expenditures on operational maintenance represents a 
change of $43,166.  
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For the model regressed on changes in scholarship and fellowship expenditures as 
a percent of total expenditures, four predictor variables were significant. Increases in 
Federal funding by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in scholarship 
and fellowship expenditures by +0.005% of total expenditures (p < 0.01), which for the 
median expenditures on scholarship and fellowship represents a change of $1,784. 
Decreases in state and local funding by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a 
change in scholarship and fellowship expenditures by +0.123% of total expenditures (p < 
0.001), which for the median expenditures on scholarship and fellowship represents a 
change of $41,049. Decreases in private gifts and contracts by 1% from the prior year 
were correlated with a change in scholarship and fellowship expenditures by -0.028% of 
total expenditures (p < 0.001), which for the median expenditures on scholarship and 
fellowship represents a change of $-9,375. Increases in auxiliary enterprises revenue by 
1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in scholarship and fellowship 
expenditures by -0.001% of total expenditures (p < 0.05), which for the median 
expenditures on scholarship and fellowship represents a change of $-449.  
The model regressed on changes in auxiliary enterprise expenditures as a percent 
of total expenditures had seven significant predictor variables. Decreases in tuition and 
fees revenue by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in auxiliary 
enterprise expenditures by +0.088% of total expenditures (p < 0.001), which for the 
median expenditures on auxiliary enterprise represents a change of $107,814. Increases in 
Federal funding by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in auxiliary 
enterprise expenditures by -0.007% of total expenditures (p < 0.001), which for the 
median expenditures on auxiliary enterprise represents a change of $-8,235. Decreases in 
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Federal funding by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in auxiliary 
enterprise expenditures by +0.017% of total expenditures (p < 0.05), which for the 
median expenditures on auxiliary enterprise represents a change of $20,543. Decreases in 
state and local funding by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in 
auxiliary enterprise expenditures by +0.036% of total expenditures (p < 0.001), which for 
the median expenditures on auxiliary enterprise represents a change of $43,446. 
Decreases in private gifts and contracts by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a 
change in auxiliary enterprise expenditures by -0.008% of total expenditures (p < 0.001), 
which for the median expenditures on auxiliary enterprise represents a change of $-9,941. 
Increases in auxiliary enterprises revenue by 1% from the prior year were correlated with 
a change in auxiliary enterprise expenditures by +0.002% of total expenditures (p < 
0.001), which for the median expenditures on auxiliary enterprise represents a change of 
$2,398. Decreases in auxiliary enterprises revenue by 1% from the prior year were 
correlated with a change in auxiliary enterprise expenditures by -0.061% of total 
expenditures (p < 0.001), which for the median expenditures on auxiliary enterprise 
represents a change of $-74,788.  
For the model regressed on changes in hospital services expenditures as a percent 
of total expenditures, four predictor variables were significant. Increases in Federal 
funding by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in hospital services 
expenditures by +0.004% of total expenditures (p < 0.01). Increases in auxiliary 
enterprises revenue by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in hospital 
services expenditures by +0.003% of total expenditures (p < 0.001). Decreases in 
auxiliary enterprises revenue by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in 
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hospital services expenditures by +0.010% of total expenditures (p < 0.05). Decreases in 
hospital revenue by 1% from the prior year were correlated with a change in hospital 
services expenditures by -0.119% of total expenditures (p < 0.001).  
MLM Summary. 
As evidenced by the change in median dollars, the size of the change in 
expenditures predicted by a change in revenue varies substantially. This is due to two 
factors. First, the amount of revenue from each source varies by magnitudes, as shown in 
Table 7, making the 1% change in revenue also differ in magnitude on the effect is has 
within the institution. Second, the dependent variable is in units of percentage of the total 
expenditures and therefore the coefficients estimated in the multi-level regression also are 
interpreted as changes in percentage of total expenditures by the institution. These two 
factors make the coefficients easily comparable, but with substantially different effects on 
predicted institution spending in dollars.  
Looking across changes in revenue, decreases in state and local funding has the 
broadest predicted effect across expenditure areas, 8 of the 10 areas. Notably, despite the 
decrease in this support, the predicted effect was to slightly increase the proportion of 
spending in each of these eight expenditure areas. Two unaffected expenditure areas were 
public service and hospital services, meaning that these two expenditure areas decreased 
proportionally with the institutional expenditure budgets.  
Conversely, increases in state and local funding had no effects on the predicted 
proportion of institutional spending in any expenditure area. Interpreted for this sample, 
these institutions spread this increased revenue across all expenditure areas evenly. No 
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area was more likely to receive a disproportionate amount of additional funding when 
state and local revenue increases.  
For increases in revenue from tuition, the effects were to decrease proportional 
spending five expenditure areas: public service, academic support, student services, 
institutional support, and operation maintenance. These changes were small, with the 
largest being a decrease of 0.02% in academic support. Decreases in these five 
expenditure areas, with the increased revenue, means the additional funds were 
distributed over the remaining five expenditure areas. But there were no statistically 
significant patterns in this spending of increased tuition revenue.  
Decreases in tuition revenue had curious effects in subsequent spending patterns. 
These decreases in tuition revenues, may come mostly from decreases in student 
enrollments or, less likely, decreases in tuition charged to enrolled students. These 
decreases in tuition revenue were rare in the dataset, of the 3,188 observations reporting 
tuition, less than 4.2% of them reported drops in tuition of 1% or greater. The model 
predicted research spending to decrease substantially, by 0.125% of total expenditures, 
and auxiliary enterprises to increase by 0.09% of total expenditures. Due to these events 
being so rare in the sample, these results should interpreted with caution.  
Implications 
These results provide important insights to answer the two research questions of 
this study. The negative changes in state funding had significantly different effects on 
many areas' proportion of expenditures than did positive changes in state funding. 
Further, tuition revenues had surprising changes in expenditure proportions for both 
positive and negative changes.  
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State funding. 
The first research question asked to what extent do changes in state funding to 
public research institutions have on changes in major expenditures areas, as a proportion 
all expenditures? The positive and negative changes in student funding have widely 
different effects on the expenditure areas as a proportion of total spending at institutions.  
The positive changes in revenues from the state government have no measured 
effect in changing the proportion of institutional spending in each expenditure area. 
Based on the results of the multi-level model regression analysis, when state revenues 
increase the additional funds are distributed evenly across each expenditure area with no 
area favored or disfavored.  
With negative changes in revenues from the state government, institutions 
respond quite differently. As discussed in detail in the results section, eight expenditure 
areas are favored. Most protected is instruction, which saw an increase of 0.34% as a 
proportion of institutional spending per 1% cut in annual state government revenues. 
Another tier of expenditure areas saw smaller increases in proportion of institutional 
spending, with academic support and operations maintenance increasing slightly by 
0.17% and 0.14% respectively. These eight expenditure areas may still see cuts in the 
funding dollars when state revenues decrease, but as a proportion the cuts are much 
smaller. Notably, the public service and hospital services were not protected during state 
funding cuts. Public service expenditures likely take a large funding cut when state funds 
are reduced. The hospital services expenditures likely do not change in response to state 
funding cuts due to two factors. First, most research institutions do not host hospitals and 
therefore this sample would not predict changes in hospital services expenditures as 
! 85!
sensitively as the other expenditure areas estimated. Second, the independent nature in 
which hospitals operate make them less susceptible to state funding cuts and more 
sensitive to change in hospital revenues, which are controlled for in this model and when 
they are cut show a substantial effect on hospital expenditure proportions.  
These results demonstrate administrators taking different strategic approaches to 
gains in state revenue than losses in state revenues. In current fiscal climate of higher 
education, many more institutions are experiencing the latter. However, more concerning 
may be that this demonstrates that most institutions are not following strategic plan which 
clearly articulates favoring one expenditure area over another when new funds are 
available. This may make it more difficult for administrators to convey a clear message to 
state legislators for additional funding if, at least in this sample of institutions, there is a 
lack of focused efforts in certain expenditure areas over others. 
The results provide insight into Bowen's "revenue theory of cost" (1980). The 
theory he articulated that institutions will spend all of their gains in and make up for all of 
their losses of state revenues. This study demonstrates how and where institutions do 
these. The gains in state revenues are spread throughout the expenditure areas, while the 
losses in state revenues cause unequal contraction and favor eight expenditure areas.  
Further, these results appear to support Dickeson's assertion that state 
appropriations are untargeted and haphazard (2010). A targeted, strategic approach would 
show in the results as a marked decrease in selected expenditure areas. The losses in state 
funded modeled did not predict this in any expenditure area.  
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Tuition revenues. 
The second research question asked to what extent do changes in tuition revenue 
at public research institutions have on changes in major expenditures areas, as a 
proportion all expenditures? Again the positive and negative changes in tuition revenue 
also have widely different effects on the expenditure areas as a proportion of total 
spending at institutions in the sample.  
When tuition revenues increase, through combinations of increased enrollment 
and raised charges to enrolled students, the additional revenue is highly likely to be spent 
in areas outside of public service, academic support, student services, institutional 
support, and operations maintenance. These five expenditure areas saw significant 
decreases in their proportion of spending when correlated with tuition revenue increases. 
Despite the additional money paid by students, the institutions in this sample spent 
proportionally less money on areas where costs are driven by student use including 
academic support, by 0.017%, and student services, by 0.005%. Academic support 
expenditures include spending for libraries, information technology, and curriculum 
development. Student services expenditures include spending in offices for admissions, 
registrar, student activities, and programs beyond academic instruction. There were no 
measurable changes in the likelihood of instruction expenditures, scholarships, or 
auxiliary enterprises which are each also have expenses driven heavily by student usage. 
Noteworthy, however, was the lack of shift in proportion of funding spent on research—
an area least related to student enrollment—which saw no likely decrease in its 
proportion of the institutional expenditures when tuition revenues rise. 
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These results strongly support the findings in the literature. In the literature 
Dickeson (2010) took issue with the rises in tuition that were not accompanied by 
increases in spending on instruction.  
Further implications. 
The univariate growth curve models estimated and reported in Table 7 show 20-
year changes in spending patterns at American research institutions. These patterns mark 
a clear increase in funding for research, and a slower increase in spending for student 
services. However these growth curves also demonstrate systemic reduction in spending 
on instruction and scholarships. The multi-level predictive model help in exploring these 
trends, but do not fully explain the reduced spending on instruction and scholarships due 
only to shifts in revenue. The increases in research spending, however, are supported 
substantially by changes in Federal funding revenues and auxiliary enterprises revenues.  
Future research 
This study is relevant to stakeholders in higher education, but especially relevant 
to academic leaders in understanding how changes in state funding and changes in tuition 
revenues are absorbed across the research universities. Legislators may be more hesitant 
to provide funding when not targeted for spending in specific areas of interest to the 
electorate. Students may also be concerned with the findings that increases in revenues do 
not increase spending at a greater rate in expenditure areas which students utilize heavily 
outside instructional expenditures.  
 This research supports the literature's recommendation of targeted funding cuts 
being more difficult to implement than across-the-board funding cuts (Bowen, 1980; 
Dickeson, 2010). The broad changes across the expenditure areas when state funding 
! 88!
occur indicate that no expenditure area is strategically less important and reduced at a 
greater rate than other expenditure areas. Conversely, when state revenues increase the 
funds are also not targeted strategically but spread proportionally throughout the 
institutions areas.  
Further, this study serves to develop a foundation for future research to examine 
where increased dollars are directed and decreased dollars are cut. The correlations found 
in the analyses demonstrate shifts in funding patterns, but do not explain why these shifts 
occur more strongly at some institutions and not at all at other institutions. Further 
research should examine these patterns for further understanding of where institutions are 
shifting their spending.  
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Figure 1: Changes Optimal Allocation of Higher Education Resources 
Supply and Demand Curves (Adapted from Paulsen, 2001) 
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Notation 
 
t = Time 
 
hei =Higher Education Institution 
 
fa = HEI expenditures in 10 functional areas as defined by IPEDS   
(e.g. instruction, research, student services, academic support, 
maintenance)   
 
rs = HEI 7 revenue sources, as defined by IPEDS (e.g. tuition, state funding, gifts, 
investments, auxiliary) 
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Figure 2: Estimated Multivariate Model 
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Table 1: IPEDS Functional Areas of Institutional Expenditures 
 
Instruction  Academic instruction conducted by the teaching faculty for the 
institution's students, excluded are primarily administrative 
expenses.  
 
Research  Activities to produce research outcomes that are commissioned 
by a separate agency, excluded are training programs.  
 
Public service Expenses cover non-instructional services to groups external to 
the institution, including cooperative extension programs.  
 
Academic support Services integral to the institutional mission such as libraries, 
information technology services, and curriculum development.  
 
Student services Admissions, registrar, and activities for student well-being 
outside academic programs. 
 
Institutional support Daily operational expenses for administration of legal, fiscal, 
public relations, and development activities.  
 
Operation and 
maintenance of plant 
Activities related to grounds and facilities maintenance, 
utilities, and insurance, it excludes operations and maintenance 
expenses already allocated to other functional areas. 
 
Scholarships and 
fellowships 
Includes grants awarded to students by the institution above 
and beyond tuition discounts and allowances.  
 
Auxiliary enterprises 
 
Self-supporting operations that charge a fee to students or staff, 
including residence halls and food services.  
 
Hospital services Costs associated with running hospitals affiliated with the 
institution.  
 
Independent 
operations 
Activities not related to the institutional mission, such as 
federally funded research and development centers.  
 
Other expenses and 
deductions 
A calculated functional area that is determined by from the 
difference between the total operating expenses and the total of 
the prior functional areas.   
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 Figure 3: Univariate growth curve model for each expenditure area  
 
 
Figure 4: Changes in expenditure area percentages, modeled with estimated intercepts 
and slopes from univarate growth curve model 
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Chapter 3. Who’s on the Inside Track:  
Examining Gender Equity in the Funding Trends of Intercollegiate Athletics  
Clinton M. Stephens 
 
Abstract 
The participation in and funding of women’s intercollegiate sports has grown 
dramatically since the 1972 passage of Title IX required equitable treatment of men and 
women in educational programs receiving federal aid. The purpose of this study was to 
understand the differences in funding growth over time for men’s and women’s teams. A 
growth curve model was used to measure these changes from 2003 to 2010 at 990 
institutions. The results showed significant differences between funding growth in men’s 
and women’s sports. The year-over-year funding of men’s teams grew substantially faster 
than funding of women’s teams over the time period. The results presented here suggest 
the gap between funding of men’s and women’s teams is growing. This study’s results 
raise doubt that intercollegiate athletics are on a path toward gender equity in the near 
future when measured by funding.  
Introduction 
On almost every college campus in the United States student athletes compete in 
intercollegiate sports with over 300,000 men and over 200,000 women participating in 
2010 (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). There is wide consensus however that, 
unlike any other place on campus, collegiate sports should be segregated and 
administered by gender. A separation like this is not seen anywhere else in education 
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(Suggs, 2005) and this separation creates a unique challenge to providing an equitable 
experience to all student athletes.  
Women were not welcome in the beginning of American intercollegiate athletics, 
starting at its inception in 1852 (Smith, 1990). After World War II male-focused college 
sports began to grow exponentially in spectators, spending, and participation (Rudolph, 
1991). In 1972, thirty years after this growth began, Congress passed Title IX and has 
since reaffirmed the legislation’s intent to end discrimination based on sex in educational 
activities. A rapid expansion in women’s intercollegiate sports participation followed. 
There are certainly more women’s teams and more funding for them today than in 1972. 
This research paper picks up after thirty more years have passed and examines the current 
trends in funding of men’s and women’s intercollegiate sports. 
Purpose 
 Participation numbers and funding for women’s sports have grown dramatically 
since the passage of Title IX. Published research has included the progress toward gender 
equity using participation data from 2000-2001 and earlier (Anderson & Cheslock, 2004; 
Anderson, Cheslock, & Ehrenberg, 2006) as well as the factors contributing toward Title 
IX compliance in athletics (Stafford, 2004). The existing literature that examined funding 
looked at the role of Title IX in men’s program reductions (Carroll & Humphreys, 2000; 
Thelin, 2000), but the literature contained no study comparing the funding of men’s and 
women’s sports across more than two points in time. A larger longitudinal study using 
more recent data and looking at sports funding by gender was needed.  
The purpose of this study was to explore how gender equity in intercollegiate 
sports has changed since 2003, as measured through funding of men’s and women’s 
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teams. To measure these changes over time a latent growth curve model was used to 
identify the level and slope of individual institutions and to estimate the collective trends 
over time at these institutions. Such an approach was necessary to measure the per-sport 
changes in funding over time while also attempting to account for factors that influence 
those changes, such as initial funding levels.  
Literature Review 
Brief history of Title IX. 
Originally passed as part of the Educational Amendments in 1972, Title IX stated 
“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” ("Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972,"). The predecessor to the Department of Education issued a policy 
interpretation in 1979 that spelled out a three-prong test it would use to measure equitable 
participation among men and women in intercollegiate athletics: 
 
1. Whether intercollegiate level participation 
opportunities for male and female students are provided in 
numbers substantially proportionate to their respective 
enrollments; or 
2. Where the members of one sex have been and are 
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether 
the institution can show a history and continuing practice of 
program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to 
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the developing interests and abilities of the members of that 
sex; or 
3. Where the members of one sex are 
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, and the 
institution cannot show a history and continuing practice of 
program expansion, as described above, whether it can be 
demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members 
of that sex have been fully and effectively accommodated 
by the present program. 
(U.S. Department of Education, 1979) 
A higher education institution could pass this test by demonstrating achievement of 
any of the three prongs. In 1996 The Department of Education clarified this point and 
emphasized the first prong of the test, substantial proportionality, as a safe harbor for 
institutions to fulfill Title IX (U.S. Department of Education, 1996). If institutions did not 
meet that criteria then the other two prongs, demonstrable responsiveness or effective 
accommodation, were to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  
Most recently the third prong of the test has received the most attention by federal 
officials. In 2005 the Department of Education, under President George W. Bush, 
provided a clarification of the third prong with a model survey for use by institutions in 
evaluating students’ interests and abilities in order to demonstrate their present athletic 
program’s compliance with part three ("Bush Changing the Rules," 2005). In April 2010 
the Commission on Civil Rights issued a report endorsing the model survey as “a reliable 
and rigorous method of ascertaining student interest in athletics” (Reynolds, 2010, p. 7). 
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Later that month the Department of Education, under President Barack Obama, issued a 
clarification on Title IX that revoked the 2005 clarification and model survey, stating 
they “do not provide the appropriate and necessary clarity regarding nondiscriminatory 
assessment methods” (Ali, 2010).  
Recent research. 
Clearly, Title IX and institutional compliance are still on the minds of policy 
makers. The most recent research in this area has focused on gender proportionality, 
factors contributing to compliance, and the effects of seeking compliance.  
Substantial proportionality between male and female athletes is provided as a path 
to compliance by prong one of the Title IX regulations and is the preferred route to 
compliance, as recommended by the Department of Education and discussed earlier in 
this paper. Achieving proportionality can be done through adding female athletes or 
reducing male athletes. In 2004 Anderson and Cheslock explored which of these avenues 
to compliance were being pursued by institutions between 1995-1996 and 2001-2002. 
They found that both female and male teams were being added, with female team 
additions growing much faster. When the gender gap at an institution was larger, only 
then were they more likely to cut men’s teams while also adding women’s teams 
(Anderson & Cheslock, 2004).  
A later study considered 741 institutions’ gender proportionality in 1995-1996 and 
found at least 89% of institutions were out of compliance (Anderson, et al., 2006). They 
examined this again using 2001-2002 data and found at least 71% of institutions were out 
of compliance, or a drop of 18% (Anderson, et al., 2006). This research found that 
Division I institutions were likely to have more gender equity than smaller institutions in 
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Division II and Division III—this was attributed to Division I institutions’ greater 
financial resources (Anderson, et al., 2006). The predictors of compliance in 2000-2001 
were explored by Stafford (2004) using regression. She found that larger institutions and 
institutions with a lower percentage of female undergraduates were predictors of 
compliance. Further, the presence of a football team substantially lowered the probability 
of compliance for an institution, as did being geographically located in the South 
(Stafford, 2004). The reduced likelihood of compliance in the presence of a football team 
was found by Sigelman and Wahlbeck (1999) and by Rishe (1999). But Rishe also 
presented evidence that more-prominent football programs lead to greater expenditures 
on female athletes (1999).  
Less work has focused on the funding for men’s teams and for women’s teams. In 
addition to Rishe’s work above, Thelin discussed policy implications after the 
enforcement of Title IX. He showed that prior to the addition of many more women’s 
programs, nonrevenue men’s sports were already widely subject to budget cuts (Thelin, 
2000). However Carroll and Humphreys found that seeking gender equity did contribute 
to increasingly the likelihood of cutting men’s athletic programs (Carroll & Humphreys, 
2000). 
This research in the published literature demonstrated that Title IX has altered 
collegiate athletics through the proportions of male and female participants and the teams 
supported by institutions. And while a few institutions have achieved Title IX compliance 
via proportionality, the majority had not as of 2001. As for finances, the funding for 
men’s and women’s teams do have an effect on each other, but it is a complex 
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relationship. All of this research used data from 2001 or earlier and there is no analysis of 
how their funding is changing over time.  
Theoretical Framework 
These previous studies that examined Title IX compliance focused only on prong 
one of the three-part test for Title IX compliance, participant proportionality. The other 
two prongs are more difficult to empirically examine across multiple institutions; it is 
challenging to quantify prong two’s vague concept of “a history and continuing practice 
of program expansion” across multiple institutions. Further, for prong three it would be a 
large undertaking to measure across multiple institutions that the underrepresented sex’s 
interests and abilities “have been fully and effectively accommodated.”  
The prior works that studied gender equity did so through participant counts using 
a longitudinal design of two years (Anderson & Cheslock, 2004; Anderson, et al., 2006; 
Rishe, 1999). This provided insight into changes between those two points in time. The 
works of Anderson and Cheslock detail the challenges of accurately measuring 
participant counts as self-reported by athletic departments to the EADA, many 
corrections had to be made to improve the quality of the data reported due to duplicated 
participant counts and unreported participant counts (Anderson & Cheslock, 2004; 
Anderson, et al., 2006). These corrections make participant counts a challenging measure 
for estimating trends over multiple years. Additionally, the small rosters of many sport 
teams make small variations each year in participants to have large effects on the year-to-
year trends. Also the zero-truncation nature of participant counts—no team has zero or 
fewer participants—does not lend itself to proper analysis. Together, these issues 
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combine to make participant counts a poor measure for analyzing trends over multiple 
years in men’s and women’s sports.  
However, team funding is a strong measure of institutional financial support and a 
good measure to use for estimating the rate of change over time. Team funding is largely 
determined independent of a single year’s participation numbers. It also is not as 
susceptible to the zero-truncation problem while being a finer-grained measure than 
participant counts. For these reasons, funding was chosen over participant counts to 
measure the recent historical trends in the gender equity of men’s teams and women’s 
teams. 
Using the measure of funding provides a different perspective on the three prongs 
of the Title IX compliance test. The first prong’s participant proportionality can be 
conceived as financial proportionality when considering the funding provided to men’s 
teams and women’s teams. Because funding levels and participant counts are largely 
independent of each other, as discussed earlier, it is useful to examine the funding 
proportionality in addition to participant proportionality.  
The second prong’s vague requirement of “a history and continuing practice of 
program expansion” is difficult to measure and becomes exponentially more difficult 
across multiple institutions. I propose growth in financial support as one method of 
measuring “program expansion.” Examining trends in funding support of men’s and 
women’s teams would provide a measurable method of how the system of intercollegiate 
athletics is progressing toward compliance with via the second prong.  
Finally, prong three’s fully-accommodated clause is not applicable when 
considering funding. The Title IX law forbids discrimination based on sex and therefore 
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the funding of men’s and women’s sports should be equitable across both sexes. A more 
nuanced view may consider funding men’s and women’s teams in proportion to the men 
and women within the overall student body. There are more women students than men at 
most institutions, and this would mean slightly more funding to women’s sports. In 2010 
of the 990 institutions in this study, 823 (83%) had more than 50% women as students 
and 295 (30%) had more than 60% women as students (U.S. Department of Education, 
2010). For the purposes of this research, gender equity were considered equitable funding 
rates for men’s sports and women’s sports.  
Growth curve modeling. 
This research sought to examine changes in funding of athletic teams over several 
years or, in other words, changes in evenly-spaced repeated observations of the same 
entities over a fixed duration of time. Latent growth curve modeling is an appropriate 
statistical technique for such analyses (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). This technique 
provides statistics that measure the rate of change over time in a dependent variable of 
interest, the funding, and statistics on the fit of the theoretical model with the observed 
measurements. Three statistics will be of most interest in this study: the intercept, the 
slope, and the intercept-slope covariance. The intercept statistic provides an estimate of 
the initial funding level of the sport. The slope is an estimate of the rate of change 
between years. Finally, the covariance statistic gives insight into how much the initial 
funding level, the intercept, affects the rate of change between years, the slope. These 
statistics together provide measurements of how funding rates are trending over time.  
Growth curve modeling was first used in the mid-1960’s in the biological sciences 
(Pothoff & Roy, 1964; Rao, 1965) and have since been adapted to social sciences (Kreft 
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& Leeuw, 1998). This technique can be applied using several different approaches 
including repeated-measures modeling, hierarchical linear modeling, and structural 
equation modeling (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Relative to each other, each of these has 
its benefits and limitations.  
This research used the structural equation modeling approach to apply growth 
curves. Using this framework a wider range of covariant variables can be used (Willett & 
Sayer, 1994). The primary limitation of using this approach is the necessity to have the 
same number of evenly-spaced repeated observations per entity. The dataset used in this 
research conform to this limitation. Each entity was a sports team and each observation 
within the team was its annual funding.  
Methods 
This study examined the funding of men’s and women’s teams at 990 institutions 
from the 2002-2003 academic year through 2009-2010. The data for this study were 
obtained from the Office of Postsecondary Education (U.S. Department of Education, 
2010), the same source used by several prior researchers (Anderson & Cheslock, 2004; 
Anderson, et al., 2006; Stafford, 2004). The data were reported by institutions in 
complying with the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA). Institutions self-report 
EADA data annually pertaining to the institution, the athletic department’s finances, and 
the individual teams’ finances, participants, and coaching staffs. The Office of 
Postsecondary Education compiles these data and makes them publicly available.  
Model. 
To measure the changes in funding of men’s and women’s teams over time, a 
linear univariate growth curve model was used to identify the level and slope of 
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individual institutions and to generate the trends over time of all institutions studied 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). See Figure 1 for the equation and Figure 2 for a diagram of 
the model. To account for unmeasured relationships between sequential funding years 
auto-correlation was used to correlate the error terms of each funding variable. Two 
models were done separately for men’s and for women’s teams to explore the changes in 
their separate funding. All models were ran using the Maximum Likelihood method in 
the R software package with the Lavaan add-on package.  
Variables. 
Funding. 
The data of interest in this study were the individual teams’ annual amount funding 
dollars received. This was measured by the total operating expenses of each team (e.g. 
coaching, equipment, and travel). This measurement is useful for analysis of changes 
over time in the medium term, less than 10 years, due to its sensitivity of annual 
expenditures. For example, this measure would detect disparities such as modes of travel 
to away competition when one team charters a plane and another team drives. Operating 
expenses were also an appropriate measure because of what it excluded. Operating 
expense funding does not include funds spent on construction of new facilities or 
overhead administration of the athletics department. By excluding one-time expenses (a 
new practice facility) or non-team-specific expenses (an accountant), this measure 
focused only on the direct financial support realized by each team. Due to the time period 
studied, 2003 to 2010, this measure was not adjusted for inflation but such an adjustment 
would be necessary for long-term financial analyses. Also this measure did not include 
expenses paid by outside entities, like an alumni association, or other non-financial 
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support. Any sport reported to have zero funding for operating expenses across all six 
years in the dataset was excluded from the analysis.  
Sports. 
The sports at each institution were separated by gender and co-ed sports were 
removed from the dataset. Men’s and women’s sports comprise most of the teams in 
intercollegiate athletics and the low number of co-ed teams, by their nature, received 
funding for both the men and the women on the team. Further research might explore the 
correlation between the gender balance of co-ed teams and their funding levels. However 
that was outside the scope of this study. All men’s and women’s sports were included in 
the analysis for this study, unless otherwise noted.  
Division. 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) groups institutions into 
Division I, Division II, and Division III. These groupings are based on several factors 
including student body size, sporting event ticket sales, and athletics teams sponsored. 
The data analyses were done only with institutions in these three divisions. Any 
institution that changed divisions during the time period studied were excluded from this 
analysis. 
Years. 
The years included in this research begin with the 2002-2003 fiscal year—the 
earliest year where detailed EADA data were available—through the most recently 
available data from 2009-2010. These fiscal years in the dataset align with the typical 
academic year calendar and all years referenced refer to the latter fiscal year, i.e. 2003 
and 2010. 
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Results 
Model fit testing. 
To evaluate that latent growth curve modeling is an appropriate statistical tool for 
measuring changes in sports funding over time, the univariate growth curve model was 
first estimated with both men’s and women’s sports together from all reporting 
institutions. The full fit indices are listed in Table 1. This test model was successfully 
overidentified, with 25 degrees of freedom, a chi-squared value of 9,249 and p < 0.001. 
This model’s Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) value of .033 is below 
the .05 threshold that Schumacker and Lomax (2010) suggested for good model fit. And 
in contrast to a null model, the test model had a fit value of .984 on the Tucker-Lewis 
Index (TLI) (1973). These multiple fit indices suggest that the test model’s estimates 
were reliable and that the variances with the observed variables were sufficiently 
consistent to allow for identification of the latent variables (Bollen, 1989). Or, in the 
context of this study, the growth in sports funding over the selected years was sufficiently 
consistent across the sample to allow for accurate estimation of the rates of funding 
growth.  
All sports across Divisions I, II, and III. 
Examining first the growth in funding of all three NCAA sports divisions, the 
model was estimated for men’s and women’s teams. Both estimations successfully 
overidentified, each had fit indices similar to the test model and indicate reliable 
estimates and reliable coefficients were obtained. 
For the men’s teams the model was estimated on 8,296  teams across 983 
institutions in Division I, II, and III. The intercept of 2.796 represents spending at levels 
!116!
of $279,629 per sport in 2003 while the slope of 0.357 represents the rate of growth each 
year from 2003 through 2010 as $35,750 annually. The intercept-slope covariance was 
also highly significant (p<0.001) at 11.774. This estimate represents that for every 
additional dollar a men’s sports team received in 2003, the team’s annual funding growth 
rate was $11.78 higher each year. These estimates for the men’s teams demonstrate that 
there is substantial growth year over year, and that this growth is much greater for teams 
already receiving more funding.  
For the women’s teams the model was estimated on 9,100 sports across 985 
institutions. All measures were highly significant (p<0.001) with an intercept estimated at 
1.439 and slope at 0.180. These represent funding in 2003 for these teams at $143,855 
and annual growth rate of their funding at $17,666. The intercept-slope covariance of 
.529 represents the teams’ annual funding growth rate was $0.53 more for every 
additional dollar the team received in 2003. These results for the women’s teams also 
represented growth year over year and that larger funding contributed minimally to larger 
growth rates.  
At these institutions in the NCAA Divisions I, II, and III, the mean funding for 
men’s teams, $279,629, in 2003 was on average $135,774 greater over the average for 
women’s teams, $143,855. And compared to the women’s teams annual growth of 
$17,666, the men’s teams average funding grew $35,750, or $18,084 faster every year 
from 2003 to 2010.  
All sports in each division.  
Next in the analysis, the univariate model was estimated by gender for each 
division individually. The estimates continued to be highly significant even as the 
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number of sports within the samples dropped due to the splitting by divisions. Next the 
intercept, slope, and their covariances are each discussed. These estimates for each 
division are graphed in Figure 3-5. 
The intercept, representing the 2003 funding average per team, for Division I was 
estimated at $689,612 and $315,581 for men’s teams and women’s teams respectively—
over double the women’s teams funding for men’s teams. In the lower-funded divisions, 
Division II funding averaged $122,837 for men’s teams and $78,495 for women’s teams; 
and Division III funding averaged $48,565 for men’s teams and $31,903 for women’s 
teams in 2003. The gap was much smaller in Division II and Division III than in Division 
I. 
The slope, representing the average growth in funding year over year, showed a 
much greater growth rate in teams of Division I over Division II, and those teams over 
Division III. In Division I the men’s teams’ rate of growth, 0.881, were over twice as fast 
as the Division I women’s teams’ rate of growth, 0.375. These represented $88,096 in 
additional funding for men’s teams every year and $37,469 in additional funding for 
women’s teams each of those same years. 
However in Division II and Division III the slopes, or growth rates each year, were 
more similar than in Division I. For Division II the men’s teams’ rate of 0.176 was 
slightly higher than the women’s teams’ rate of 0.121. These represent $17,645 and 
$12,054 in additional funding every year, respectively. And in Division III the growth 
rates were lower, at 0.010 for men’s teams and 0.005 for women’s teams—or a growth in 
dollars of $4,925 and $3,755. 
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The covariance of the intercept slope, representing the effect of each additional 
dollar in 2003 on the rate of growth in funding, was most pronounced in Division I men’s 
teams with every additional dollar in 2003 contributing to a $31.81 higher annual growth 
rate in the subsequent years. In contrast, women’s teams in Division I gained $0.93 in 
higher growth rates in the following years for every additional dollar the received in 
2003. Division II and Division III had much smaller covariances, though they were all 
positive. The Division II men’s and women’s teams had covariances of 0.257 and .035 
respectively. In Division III the men’s and women’s teams had covariances of 0.030 and 
0.001 respectively. The results here mean that Division II and Division III have more 
steady growth each year, regardless of their previous funding levels, than the Division I 
teams’ substantially increasing growth rates.  
The three divisions all were growing in funding over the time period and men’s 
teams gained more than women’s teams, but that is the where comparisons between the 
divisions’ funding rates ends. Their growth rates are dramatically different. This 
difference is also getting larger, as evidenced by the intercept-slope covariance estimates.  
Basketball by division. 
Of the sports played by both men and women basketball is the most prominent; 
men’s basketball and women’s basketball are played at nearly every institution in the 
NCAA Divisions I, II, and III. Additional models were estimated for men’s and women’s 
basketball teams to further explore the funding growth rates of a sport that widely shared 
by both genders. The results were reported in Table 2. These teams exhibited estimates 
similar to the prior models of all the teams. Next the similarities and differences across 
the divisions are discussed. 
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In Division I the men’s and women’s basketball teams in 2003 had funding of 
$1,298,652 and $851,597 on average, respectively. The annual growth rates of their 
funding, $176,920 for men’s basketball and $90,790 for women’s basketball, were 
substantially higher than the growth rates of all sports of Division I. And the covariance 
of their funding estimate demonstrates that each year men’s basketball grew $14.39 faster 
for every additional dollar they received, and women’s basketball grew $2.66 faster for 
every additional dollar they received.  
In Division II and Division III the model estimates are different from Division I. 
The funding in 2003 was much more similar for men and women, respectively, $222,782 
and $191,628 in Division II, and $75,107 and $63,622 in Division III. Also the rate of 
annual funding growth for each gender was only slightly higher for men’s teams over the 
women’s teams in both divisions. Finally, the covariance estimates were not statistically 
significant in Division II, indicating that the established funding levels do not have a 
detectable effect on the annual funding growth rate. In Division III men’s teams 
covariance estimate was -0.018 and highly significant (p < 0.001) while the women’s 
teams covariance estimate not significant. This means for the Division III men’s teams 
that the higher the funding of a team, the slower its growth in funding each year. This is 
the only place in this research analysis where higher funding levels did not predict faster 
funding growth.  
In Division I there were large differences between funding levels and growth of 
funding for men’s and women’s basketball. Though these differences were much smaller 
in the Division II and Division III teams.  
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Implications 
These results provided new insight into the changes in the funding of 
intercollegiate athletics over the six-year period studied. In the following discussion, the 
growth in funding over time will be explored, then results will be considered from the 
perspective of Title IX.  
Funding level growth rates. 
The funding levels of men’s and women’s sports confirmed the trends identified in 
the literature review—that Division I men’s sports received substantially higher funding 
than Division I women’s sports (Carroll & Humphreys, 2000; Rishe, 1999; Thelin, 2000). 
The findings from this study suggested that this difference in funding of men’s teams and 
women’s teams was prevalent in NCAA Divisions I, II, and III. This study demonstrated 
that the gap existed in all divisions, but that the gap is smaller by percentage in Division 
II and Division III.  
The models estimated in this research have demonstrated that the growth rates in 
funding for men’s teams were faster than the growth rates for women’s teams. Put 
another way, women’s teams funding increases were smaller than the men’s teams’ 
funding increases. Moreover, the gap grew substantially faster in Division I.  
These findings are in contrast to Anderson et al. (2006) that found greater gender 
equity, as measured by participant proportionality, was more likely at Division I 
institutions and attributed this to the Division I institutions’ greater financial resources. 
This study’s findings indicated that those greater financial resources in Division I were 
being contributed toward men’s teams over twice as fast as they were being contributed 
toward women’s teams.  
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The speed of funding growth rates also continued to accelerate in nearly all 
divisions. The covariance terms measured this acceleration, where it was most 
pronounced in Division I men’s teams. This acceleration in the funding growth rate of 
men’s teams, an additional $31.84, dwarfed the acceleration in funding growth rate 
experienced by the Division I women’s teams of $0.89. Men’s teams were not only 
growing faster, the speed of the growth rate was also accelerating.  
The level of funding was higher for men’s teams in all NCAA divisions, the annual 
funding increases were higher for men’s teams, and the size of those funding increases 
was growing faster for men’s teams. These effects were most apparent in Division I. All 
of this taken together indicates that, without major changes to the funding growth rates, 
the funding gap between men’s teams and women’s teams will continue to get wider.  
Title IX. 
The Title IX ban on sex discrimination was implemented in regulations with the 
three-prong test. As discussed earlier, the third prong is not applicable when considering 
funding. Of the relevant prongs, the first prong emphasized participant proportionality as 
the safe harbor for compliance (U.S. Department of Education, 1996). However, when 
measured as funding proportionality this study’s results showed that there was 
widespread disproportional funding and disproportional allocation of new funding 
through measuring the growth rates. This was measured in all three NCAA divisions. 
Though individual institutional performance may vary, as a system intercollegiate 
athletics was not allocating funds on a path toward more proportional funding.  
The second prong of the test allowed institutions to demonstrate “a history and 
continuing practice of program expansion.”  This study’s use of funding trends provided 
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an insight into how the intercollegiate athletics system was performing over the past six 
years. The trends reported here did indicate a pattern of financial expansion—as 
measured by funding growth—in women’s teams, but this financial expansion was 
eclipsed by greater funding growth of men’s teams.  
Further research. 
The results detailed here lead to additional questions that are worth exploring in 
future research. These include an examination of the role of football, the funding 
differences of private and public institutions, and an institutional-level study of funding 
growth rates.  
The contribution of football to these findings is undeniable. The reviewed 
literature spoke to the positive effects that football programs have on funding for 
women’s teams. This should be further explored to understand how the findings 
presented here are influenced by the presence of football teams.  
Public and private institutions may operate very differently in their funding of 
athletic teams. Antidotal reports have described several private Division III institutions 
growing their enrollments through adding teams and therefore athletes (Sander, 2008). If 
this motivation is widespread, it may be evidenced in a different pattern of funding 
growth for men’s and women’s teams at these institutions. 
This research looked at the system of intercollegiate athletics and considered Title 
IX of the system, however in practice Title IX compliance is evaluated only at the 
institutional level. Future work should examine the funding growth rates, as studied here, 
but at the institutional level. One avenue may be to parallel the work by Anderson, et al 
(2006) and use funding proportionality.  
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Conclusions 
This study’s results provided an additional perspective by measuring funding 
instead of participants in intercollegiate athletics. It provided insight into the fiscal 
resources allocated by institutions to men’s and women’s teams as a measure of 
institutional support for those teams. The findings demonstrated that the growth in 
funding for men’s teams is greater and getting faster than the growth in funding for 
women’s teams. This was measured in all three NCAA divisions, but was most 
pronounced in Division I. As for Title IX compliance, the intercollegiate athletic system 
was not meeting proportionality through funding, and the trends over time indicated that 
the gap between men’s funding and women’s funding was getting larger, and also 
accelerating.  
Thirty years after the passage of Title IX, the growth in funding for women’s 
teams lags far behind the growth in funding for men’s teams and this is resulting in the 
gap between their funding to grow wider. Of the over 500,000 participants in 
intercollegiate athletics, 300,000 are men and 200,000 are women. Without major 
changes in funding growth rates found in the past six years, the two are not on a path 
toward funding equity in the future.  
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 Funding!"#$,!"#$% = Intercept!"#$% + !!"#$∗Slope!"#$% + ε!"#$,!"#$% 
 
Figure 1. Equation of univariate latent growth curve model 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Diagram of univariate latent growth curve model 
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  Figure 3. Division I funding for men’s and women’s sports teams, graph based on univariate 
growth curve estimates of intercept and slope 
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  Figure 4. Division II funding for men’s and women’s sports teams, graph based on univariate 
growth curve estimates of intercept and slope 
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  Figure 5. Division III funding for men’s and women’s sports teams, graph based on univariate 
growth curve estimates of intercept and slope 
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Table 3 
Median funding of each sports team, by NCAA division, and the sum totals of each sport, in 2009-2010 academic year 
 Division I Division II Division III  
 Men Women Men Women Men Women Total 
Football $4,573,220 NA $963,948 NA $328,514 NA $2,006,141,495 
Basketball $1,528,448 $1,141,371 $352,635 $324,521 $107,461 $94,351 $1,578,041,714 
Soccer $535,650 $577,401 $208,225 $210,732 $70,048 $66,598 $456,954,893 
Track and Field 
& Cross 
Country* 
$435,949 $567,535 $162,940 $171,295 $87,935 $73,425 $402,744,374 
Baseball $752,238 NA $249,661 NA $98,420 NA $361,611,415 
Volleyball $336,869 $578,772 $98,421 $199,241 $36,835 $63,128 $302,444,090 
Softball NA $545,141 NA $199,812 NA $69,411 $250,305,643 
Tennis $213,547 $280,409 $77,545 $77,025 $25,133 $22,898 $226,203,026 
Golf $215,500 $235,175 $82,506 $81,223 $24,998 $25,153 $191,928,584 
Swimming and 
Diving* $375,898 $497,940 $141,985 $191,110 $60,301 $57,690 $177,993,197 
Ice Hockey $1,683,038 $1,113,702 $963,259 $747,923 $141,119 $123,932 $134,385,372 
Lacrosse $644,543 $495,275 $237,890 $155,269 $96,901 $74,685 $133,621,224 
Rowing $387,002 $620,801 $99,004 $207,949 $82,372 $86,358 $87,270,287 
Wrestling $567,903 NA $205,015 $3,979 $87,953 $28,062 $63,377,904 
Field hockey NA $585,578 NA $182,688 NA $69,226 $60,329,103 
Gymnastics $621,836 $689,129 $39,206 $280,676 $123,270 $90,609 $57,493,101 
Cross Country* $79,749 $89,880 $45,078 $51,252 $12,868 $14,055 $30,497,059 
Swimming* $253,318 $296,192 $87,640 $111,846 $38,074 $36,907 $29,731,422 
Track and Field, 
Outdoor* $126,490 $133,915 $56,331 $54,364 $26,783 $23,691 $21,059,018 
Water Polo $210,566 $300,292 $90,110 $117,481 $45,566 $41,624 $19,929,409 
Equestrian NA $789,813 NA $84,265 $2,100 $68,419 $13,726,403 
Skiing $301,106 $299,063 $126,630 $90,177 $43,969 $42,197 $11,477,941 
Track and Field, 
Indoor* $100,944 $162,423 $40,649 $41,048 $21,377 $21,222 $10,186,171 
Fencing $128,533 $167,463 $109,629 $62,420 $34,546 $28,706 $8,512,517 
Bowling NA $116,573 $150,118 $55,654 NA $28,348 $5,668,801 
Squash $121,933 $128,547 NA NA $46,691 $45,569 $4,055,141 
Synchronized 
Swimming* 
NA $417,981 NA $251,978 NA $28,177 $2,074,506 
Sailing $106,382 $104,933 NA NA NA $45,250 $1,853,295 
Rifle $83,414 $153,844 NA $26,267 NA $18,602 $1,652,178 
Rodeo $139,252 $117,779 $105,557 $91,790 $51,258 $23,658 $1,597,783 
Diving $143,052 NA NA NA NA NA $143,052 
Archery NA $136,478 NA NA NA NA $136,478 
Weight Lifting NA NA $18,700 $16,100 NA NA $110,601 
Table Tennis NA NA $24,486 $19,021 NA NA $87,013 
Badminton NA NA NA NA NA $8,679 $8,679 
Total $3,521M $1,810M $475M $353M $288M $207M $6,653,352,889 
NA Not applicable, no institution offers the sport 
 * Institutions allowed to aggregate or disaggregate these sports when reporting !
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
As the American economy struggles to recover from the Great Recession public 
higher education institutions are going to continue to feel the effects of tightening 
financial resources from their state’s legislatures. The research presented here contributed 
to our understanding of the systemic consequences of these effects and the priorities that 
these institutions had through studying how they allocated financial resources.  
The first article contributed in four major ways to our understanding of academic 
program closures. The study identified environmental variables that stakeholders can 
monitor. It provided a more complex and contrasting perspective to Dickeson's findings 
in 2010. Morgan's stages of budget contraction at HEI (1982) are affirmed by this study. 
Finally, the economic model of HEI advanced by Paulsen is partially supported with this 
study. 
The second article provided insights to how changes in the revenues of higher 
education institutions disproportionally effect changes in expenditures. The research 
demonstrated that negative changes in state funding had significantly different effects on 
many areas' proportion of expenditures than did positive changes in state funding. 
Further, tuition revenues had unexpected changes in expenditure proportions for both 
positive and negative changes. 
Finally, looking at financial priorities from a gender-equity perspective, the third 
article provided insight into the fiscal resources allocated by institutions to men’s and 
women’s inter-collegiate athletics teams as a measure of institutional support for those 
teams. The findings demonstrated that the growth in funding for men’s teams is greater 
and getting faster than the growth in funding for women’s teams. These longitudinal 
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trends indicated that the gap between men’s funding and women’s funding was getting 
larger, and also accelerating.  
Further research 
These three articles were written as the starting points for three lines of inquiry 
that will lead to multiple future research projects. The first article on academic program 
closures began to uncover the system-wide reasons that higher education institutions 
decide to close programs. But the model used needs refined with a multi-level design to 
account for institution-level effects. Additionally, developing a dynamic model using the 
Arellano-Bond technique, a class of Generalized Method of Moments, would allow for 
including the prior year’s funding levels while avoiding endogeny by using the prior 
values as instrumental variables (Austin 2010, Hillman 2011, Titus 2009).  
The second article with expenditure ratios is only scratching the surface in 
examining how changes in revenues lead to changes expenditure ratios. The article 
focused only on state funding and on tuition revenues however other funding sources—
including grants, contracts, and investment returns—were left unexamined. Similar 
analysis of these revenue sources could lead to further insights into trends in 
expenditures. Further in this line of inquiry is also a closer examination of selected 
expenditure areas and how they gain or lose funding based on changes in revenue. Key 
expenditure areas that would be of higher interest to stakeholders include expenditures on 
instruction, research, service, and student services.  
Finally, the third article’s examination of institutional priorities through inter-
collegiate athletic team spending by gender needs further exploration. The longitudinal 
dataset is relatively short and including additional years in the analysis will strengthen its 
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predictive power. The EADA dataset also comes with its own limitations, chiefly its self-
reported nature. Using alternative datasets collected by independent agencies for analysis 
would provide alternative perspectives.  
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